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ACCURACY INQUIRIES FOR ALL FELONY AND
MISDEMEANOR PLEAS: VOLUNTARY PLEAS
BUT INNOCENT DEFENDANTS?
JOHN L. BARKAi t
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the popular myth of American jurisprudence that a
defendant's guilt or innocence is determined by a jury of his peers,
conviction by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is a long-standing
feature of the American criminal justice system.1 Although no
national statistics are available, it is estimated that between eighty-
five to ninety-five percent of all criminal convictions result from
guilty pleas.2 A defendant's guilty plea relieves the government of
its obligation to produce evidence proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not, however, strip a defendant
of all the protections against unfair or improper methods that might
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I The practice of plea bargaining derives from attempts to mitigate the harsh
punishments of 17th century English courts. Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of
Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385, 396 (1951); Note, Plea Bargaining-justice
Off the Record, 9 WAsnnrtN LJ. 430, 432 (1970). "Plea bargains have accom-
panied the whole history of [American] criminal jurisprudence." Bryan v. United
States, 492 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974); see
Comment, The Plea Bargain in Historical Perspective, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 499
(1974) and cases cited therein. For the first treatment of the subject in the
Supreme Court, see Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
2 See ABA PROJECT ON MInIMUM STA-NDAnDS FOR CIMiNAL JUTTIcE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUrnTy 1-2 (App. Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA
PLEA, STANDADS]; D. NEwmA CoNvCniON: TnE DETERMwNATION OF GuILT oR
INNOCENCE WrrHouT TRIAL 3 (1966); Tim PRESmENT'S CommissION ON LAw
ENIoOcElEMNT AND ADMIIsTRATION OF jUsTncE, TASK FORCE REPOT: THE CouRTs
9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CouRTS].
Because fewer and less accurate statistics are compiled on misdemeanors than
on felonies, this Article must assume that people charged with misdemeanors plead
at approximately the same rate as those charged with felonies. Support for this
assumption is found in a study showing that the likelihood of a defendant pleading
guilty increases as the seriousness of the crime decreases. H. KALVEN & H. ZErsEL,
THE AMraucAN JURY 20 (1966).
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be employed against him in the plea process, just as a defendant
who elects to stand trial is protected from the use of improper
methods against him at trial. Voluntariness and understanding, for
example, are well-established constitutional prerequisites to a valid
guilty plea.3
As the courts accorded formal recognition to plea bargaining,4
increasing attention was focused on the institutional and personal
pressures that induce defendants to plead guilty. Particular con-
cern centered on the innocent defendant whose legal guilt might be
sealed by a plea of guilty. This concern is reflected in rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 and in numerous state
cases and statutes 1 requiring a trial judge, in certain situations, to
establish a factual basis for a guilty plea before accepting it. Ex-
cept under the federal standard, however, the accuracy inquiry is
generally required only in felony cases. Defendants who plead
3 See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
4 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), holding that "[tihe
disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused,
sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the admin-
istration of justice." Id. 260.
G"Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of
guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such
inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." Fr. R. CRnn. P.
11(f). Notice, however, that the accuracy inquiry is only made for guilty pleas in
the federal courts and does not apply to nolo contendere pleas.
6 Among those states currently employing some form of factual basis require-
ment are: Arizona, State v. Campbell, 107 Ariz. 348, 488 P.2d 968 (1971), A=z.
R. Cnma. P. 17.3; Arkansas, Byler v. State, 257 Ark. 15, 513 S.W.2d 801 (1974)
(by implication); California, CAL. PNNAL CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1977);
Colorado, People v. White, 182 Colo. 417, 514 P.2d 69 (1973), COLO. Buy. STAT.
§ 16-7-207(2) (f) (1973); Connecticut, State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 365 A.2d
1100 (1976); Delaware, DEL. SUPER. CT. Cmrf. B. 11; Florida, Williams v. State,
316 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1975), FLA. R. CRs. P. 3.170(i); Illinois, People v. Hudson,
7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (1972), ILL. Sup. CT. R. 40 2(c); Iowa, State
v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); Kansas, Widener v. State, 210 Kan. 234,
499 P.2d 1123 (1972), KAx. STAT. ANN. §22-3210(4) (1974); Maine, Child v.
State, 253 A.2d 691 (Me. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1044 (1970); ME. R. CRmn.
P. 11(a); Michigan, People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977), Micff. Cmur. CT. B. 785.7(3); Minnesota, State
v. Spann, 289 Minn. 497, 182 N.W.2d 873 (1970), MINN. B. CRat. P. 15.01, 15.02;
Nebraska, State v. LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 193 N.W.2d 763 (1972); New Jersey,
State v. Pugh, 117 N.J. Super. 26, 283 A.2d 537 (1971); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
Azm. § 41-23-21(h) (Supp. 1975); New York, People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304,
206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1965); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1022(c) (1975); North Dakota, State v. McKay, 234 N.W.2d 853 (N.D.
1975), N.D. B. Cua. P. 11(e); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 135.395 (1975-76);
Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461, 317 A.2d 228 (1974); South
Carolina, State v. Armstrong, 263 S.C. 594, 211 S.E.2d 889 (1975); Texas, TEx.
CODE Cnim. Pnoc. ANN. art. 1.15 (Vernon 1973); Vermont, VT. B. CRIM. P. 11(f);
Washington, WASm. SuPm. CT. Cnm. B. 4.2(d); Wisconsin, Salters v. State, 52
Wis. 2d 708, 191 N.W.2d 19 (1971), Wis. STAT. ANN. 971.08(1)(b) (1971).
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guilty to misdemeanor charges 7 are rarely accorded similar
protection.
This Article will discuss the development of and rationale for
the accuracy inquiry. In addition to demonstrating that application
of the accuracy requirement to all guilty pleas will enhance the
quality of American criminal justice without producing undue
costs for the lower courts, the following discussion will reveal that
no difference between felony-and misdemeanor charges can justify
the decision to apply the accuracy requirement solely to felony
cases. Rather, this Article proposes that an accuracy inquiry be
extended to all felony and misdemeanor guilty pleas in state as
well as federal courts. A standard for the accuracy inquiry will be
proposed that is consistent with the procedural safeguards required
within an adversarial system of justice 8 that nonetheless recognizes
the seemingly intractable problems facing the courts.
II. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS AND THE GUILTY PLEA
The protections afforded a defendant during the plea process
fall into the general categories of intelligence, voluntariness, and
accuracy. They are implemented by inquiries made at the time
the plea is offered.9 The intelligence inquiry is to ensure that the
defendant understands the nature of the charge and the conse-
quences of his plea.10 The voluntariness inquiry is to ensure that
7 Although states vary as to the manner in which offenses are classified as mis-
demeanors or felonies, see Kainisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Mni. L. REv. 1, 64-67
(1963), the most widely adopted standard is that a misdemeanor is an offense
punishable by not more than one year's imprisonment. See MoDE. PENAL Cob&E
§ 1.04 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961). Therefore, in this Article the term
"misdemeanor" will be used to refer to offenses punishable by a fine or imprisonment
not exceeding a term of one year.
8 Implicit in this proposal for a procedural solution to the accuracy problem
surrounding guilty pleas is an assumption that a more formalized procedure is the
most effective. In this respect, the argument favors a procedure consistent with the
due process model of criminal procedure as described by the late Professor Herbert
L. Packer. See H. PAcmi, THE LarS OF THE Cm NAL SAmCTIo N 149-73 (1968).
For an argument that, at least in the lower courts, less, rather than more formalized
procedure may be the answer, see, Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a
Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
9 The accuracy inquiry may be made after the plea providing it is completed
prior to judgment or sentence. See cases cited in note 228 infra & accompanying
text
-
0 The concept of intelligence has also been expressed as "understanding,"
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 233 (1927), or "knowing.' Fontaine v.
United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973). A guilty plea is valid only if "made voluntarily
after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences." Kercheval,
supra, at 223. For a list of the concerns generally regarded as part of the "under-
standing" or "intelligence" aspect of the plea, see ABA PLrA STANrDARs, supra note
2, at § 1.4.
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no defendant offers a plea because he is the victim of impermissible
pressures.'. Together the intelligence and voluntariness inquiries
should demonstrate that a defendant understands 1) that imper-
missible pressures may not be used to secure his plea; 2) the nature
of the charge against him; 12 3) that a plea waives certain consti-
tutional rights,13 and 4) that certain consequences will follow a
plea conviction. 4 Regardless of the vigor with which the intelli-
gence and voluntariness inquiries are pursued, that effort is largely
wasted if a defendant is allowed to plead unknowingly to a charge
within which his conduct does not fall. The purpose of the accu-
racy inquiry is precisely to ensure that no defendant offers a plea
"without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within
the charge." "I
The voluntariness/intelligence '1 and accuracy protections dif-
fer in their derivation, historical periods of development, and in the
"t1 "A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act, is void." Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,
493 (1962). Judicial inquiries as to voluntariness are concerned about the use of
violence, threatened violence, inducements, deception, and trickery. The voluntari-
ness inquiry considers the following factors: (1) the defendant's understanding of
permissible inducements to the plea; (2) the defendant's understanding of the
nature of the charge; (3) the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his
plea (i.e. the maximum sentence, mandatory minimum sentence, eligibility of parole,
possible collateral consequences); (4) the defendant's knowledge as to the constitu-
tional rights he waives when he chooses to plead. A defendant should be informed
of the rights waived by a plea of guilty. Voluntariness is not always easy to define,
and, as will be seen, is frequently combined with the "understanding" requirement.
"Voluntariness" has been characterized as "exceedingly ambiguous," CourTs, supra
note 2, at 108, 116, and as having "chameleon-like properties," J. Bo.D, PLEA
BAnGAnKNG AND GuiLTY PxrAs 75 (1975).
12
"[B]eal notice of the true nature of the charge ... [is] the first and most
universally recognized requirement of due process .... Smith v. O'Grady, 312
U.S. 329, 334 (1941); see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); Fan.
R. Cum. P. 11(c)(1); ABA PLEA STANDA Us, supra note 2, § 1.4(a) & commentary.
13 In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), the Court indicated that
a plea of guilty waives (1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
(2) the right to trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront one's accusers. There
is considerable disagreement among the states as to whether those three rights, com-
monly referred to as the Boykin rights, must be specifically waived on the record.
See J. BOND, supra note 11, at § 3.08; F. INBAu, CASEs A CoxNsrs ON CIaMEAL
Puocanuan 813-14 (1974).
14 Although a defendant must understand the "consequences" of his plea, this
has been limited to the "direct consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 755 (1970). The dispositional alternatives that are of concern to the courts
are minimum and maximum sentences, consecutive sentencing possibilities, applicable
habitual offender statutes, and ineligibility for parole. See FED. R. CFamN. P. ll(c)
(1); ABA PLxA STANrnas, supra note 2, at § 1.4(c) & commentary; ALI MODEL
CODE OF PirE-AorAGNmmT PRocEDuRE § 350.4, commentary at 618-20 (Proposed
Official Draft 1975); J. Bo,,n, supra note 11, at § 3.38-.42.
15 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (quoting Advisory
Committee Notes to FE. B. Cram. P. 11).
16 It is sometimes difficult to discern where the concept of "voluntariness" ends
and that of "intelligence" begins. The voluntariness and intelligence requirements
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amount of legal commentary devoted to each. Voluntariness has
emerged from a long line of Supreme Court decisions as a consti-
tutionally compelled due process requirement.'7 Its contours and
ramifications have attracted extensive attention within the legal
literature.18 The accuracy requirement, on the contrary, stems
from policy1 9 rather than constitutional considerations.20  It has
come into prominence only within the last decade, and rarely has
it been the subject of critical analysis. 21  The most significant dis-
tinction between the voluntariness and accuracy protections, how-
ever, is in the breadth of their application. The utilization of the
two protections has come to depend upon the category of crime
charged (felony or misdemeanor), the jurisdiction within which the
crime was allegedly committed, and the sovereign levying the
charge (federal, state or municipal).
There is also a major transactional difference between the vol-
untariness and the accuracy inquiries with respect to the direction
of information flow. In the voluntariness inquiry,22 the flow of in-
formation is from the judge to the defendant. In the accuracy in-
quiry, in contrast, flow is from the defendant to the judge.23  Be-
are sufficiently similar that, for purposes of this Article, the two requirements can
be grouped together to facilitate comparison with the accuracy requirement. Cf.
J. BOND, supra note 11, at § 3.02 (grouping together voluntariness and intelligence
requirements for guilty plea acceptance). Hereinafter, only the word "voluntary" or
"voluntariness" will appear although "intelligence" is also intended unless specifically
excluded.
17 See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); MeMann v. Richardson, 397 "U.S. 759 (1970); Parker
v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Carter v. Illinois, 329
U.S. 173 (1946); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Waley v. Johnston, 316
U.S. 101 (1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941); Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
18 See, e.g., sources cited in M. MARcus & R. WsmToN, PLEA BARGAIn,G:
A SErucmD Bxnu mxocn"y (1976).
1 9 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).
20 For a discussion of the argument that the factual basis requirement is required
by the due process clause, see note 156 infra.
2 1 Legal literature on the plea process at most alludes briefly to the accuracy
requirement and is mainly devoted to voluntariness considerations. Exceptions in-
clude Note, Standards for Accepting Guilty Pleas to Misdemeanor Charges, 8 U.
Mici. J.L. REF. 568 (1975) and Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to the
Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WAsa U.L.Q. 306, in addition to various case
notes on relevant Supreme Court opinions.
2 2 See note 11 supra.
23 The judge must ascertain whether the defendant's acts and intent are those
required for the crime to which he pleaded, or for a more serious crime. ABA PLEA.
STANDAaDS, supra note 2, at 33. The judge makes this judicial verification of guilt
after comparing the expressed factual basis for this defendant's activity to the re-
quired factual basis for the crime.
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cause there is less need for individualized treatment when a judge
is providing information to a defendant, some states have provided
alternatives to the method of personal interrogation for determining
the voluntariness of a misdemeanor plea 24 by using group arraign-
ments 25 or by using printed forms, 28 even though both of these
methods have drawbacks. 27
Although voluntariness is constitutionally required in every
jurisdiction for every category of crime, the accuracy requirement
has a narrower applicability. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 28 mandates an accuracy requirement for all
guilty pleas in federal courts. Although many states have a similar
requirement 29 when the charged offense is a felony, it has scant
application in the states as to misdemeanors. 30 This artificial dis-
tinction between felonies and misdemeanors inevitably perpetuates
24 States apparently read Boykin to require personal interrogation; as a result,
alternative methods have not been used in felony pleas. States that employ alter-
natives for misdemeanors attempt to distinguish Boykin by limiting it to felony pleas.
25 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1965); Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1973).
26 See, e.g., In re Birch, 10 Cal. 3d 314, 515 P.2d 12, 110 Cal. Rptr. 212
(1973); Mills v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P-2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1973). A court may use forms to inform the defendant of the proper or improper
pressures that might be applied to him and the probable consequences of his plea.
In addition, the forms can become part of the record.
27 The use of group arraignments does not fulfill the objectives of the plea.
Obviously the judge is acting personally, but the address to the group renders the
effect of personal interrogation a nullity. Although the use of forms is ostensibly
less time consuming, it is clearly less satisfactory than direct interrogation. More
total time will be expended filling out forms and reading them than if the defendant
were interrogated by the judge on the record. The use of forms also would eliminate
the opportunity of the judge to infer and pursue indications of involuntariness that
would be demonstrated by the defendant's hesitation in answering voluntarinesss
questions.
28 Note 5 supra.
29 Note 6 supra.
30 The majority of jurisdictions have not applied the factual basis requirement
to misdemeanors. Six states, however, have enacted statutes or court rules which,
either expressly or through judicial interpretation, require a factual basis to be
determined in guilty pleas to misdemeanor charges. Am. R. Cumn. P. 17.1(b) &
17.3 (1975) (excluding minor traffic offenses); FLA. R. Cmiu. P. 3.010, 3.170(j);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210(4) (1974) (by implication, as other procedures in the
plea rule are limited to felony cases); Mica. DisT. CT. B. 785.4; NJ. MN. CT. B.
7:4-2(b); Onro REv. CoDE Ar. § 2937.07 (Page 1975); accord, City of Cleveland
v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio App. 2d 79, 278 N.E.2d 374 (1972).
In Illinois, a factual basis is strongly recommended if the offense charged is
punishable by imprisonment. People v. Bailey, 12 IMI. App. 3d 779, 301 N.E.2d 481
(1973) (dictum); People v. Trinka, 10 Ill. App. 3d 183, 293 N.E.2d 179 (1973).
Although Pennsylvania does not specifically require a hearing to establish the factual
basis of a plea, such is the preferred practice. PA. R. Crms. P. 319 & comment.
Only Texas has specifically held that a factual basis need not be established for
a misdemeanor plea. See Buchanan v. State, 480 SAV.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Crim.
App.), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 814 (1972).
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a tendency in the lower court system to dispense what has appro-
priately been called "assembly-line justice." 31 The procedural
protections that will be provided to defendants accused of identical
criminal acts will thus, depend upon the jurisdiction within which
they are prosecuted and the authorities-federal, state, or local-
responsible for the prosecution. The irony of this procedural dis-
parity is that, although only a voluntariness inquiry is constitu-
tionally required,, the protection it affords is circumvented without
an equally effective accuracy inquiry.
Because accuracy inquiries have in fact improved the quality
and credibility of the plea process for felonies, 32 it is reasonable to
anticipate that accuracy inquiries would produce a corresponding
improvement in the quality of misdemeanor pleas. But defendants
charged with misdemeanors generally, have not been afforded the
same accuracy protection as those charged with felonies. This dis-
parity is typical of that imbalance within American criminal justice
which tolerates an inferior, highly criticized strata of lower courts 3
which are rarely the -beneficiaries of genuine reform.34
3i Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
32The factual basis requirement has been referred to as perhaps the most im-
portant aspect of the plea proceedings. 8 Mooan's FEDERAL PaAc-ncE - 11.0111],
at 11-5 (2d ed. Supp. 1976). But see State v. LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 766, 193
N.W.2d 763 (1972) (Newton, J., dissenting) (when defendant had information
served upon him, the statute read to him, and accompanied by his retained counsel,
he entered a plea of guilty, the dissent stated "Iflor the court to be required to
inquire further into the facts pertaining to the offeiise would be fo require a
superfluous, act and verges on the ridiculous").
33 See, e.g., S. BiNG & S. RosEnmr, THE QuALiTY OF JusTcE IN Tm Lowan
CammuAsL CouRTs OF MNEToPoLITAN BosroN (1970); L. DowNmE, Jusnmc D2,rMn
(1971); H. JAm s, Cmsrs IN =H CouRTs (1968); R. Motor, Oun CnmnsNiAL CoURTs
(1930); D. OArs & W. LnuN, A CRuvnNAL JusnC1 SYsTEM AND TEM IIGENT
(1968); THE PsFRasrwr's CoMamlssION oN LAw ENFORCEMENT'A.ND ADimINsTRATIoN
OF JUSTcE, TASK FoRcE REPoRT: T=. Counrs (1967); Barrett, Criminal justice:
The Problem of Mass Production, 'in THE CounTs, THE PuBLic, AND = LAW-
EXPLOSiON 85 (H. Jones ed. 1965); RouGH JusricE (J. Robertson ed. 1974); MAss
PRODUCTON JuSTE AND T=E CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL (C. Whitebread ed. 1970);
Katz, Municipal Courts-Another Urban Iil, 20 CAsE W. RPs. L. REV.'87 (1968);
Platt, An Odd Couple: The Criminal Sanction and the Municipal Ordinance, 7
W. rk rr L.J. 43 (1971); Note, Inferior Courts in Alabama, 24 ATA. L. REv.
509 (1972); Note, Metropolitan Criminal Courts of First Instance, 70 HAnv. L. REv.
320 (1956).
34 Although some improvements in the lower courts have occurred as a result
of Supreme Court decision's, cases cited note 109 infra, defendants in lower courts
typically receive diluted justice. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (counsel must be appointed for all indigent defendants charged with
feloniek) with Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (counsel must be ap-
pointed only for those indigent defendants upon whom imprisonment is imposed).
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III. BENEFITS OF AN AccURAcY REQUIREMENT
An accuracy requirement for a valid plea is fulfilled by estab-
lishing a factual basis 5 for the plea to the satisfaction of the judge
accepting the plea."6 The factual basis determination may (1) assist
a judge in the voluntariness determination, 37 (2) make appellate
review of a plea less complex,38 (3) facilitate the rehabilitation of a
defendant,3 9 and (4) provide protection for an innocent defendant. 0
The most frequently advanced and widely accepted justification
for a factual basis requirement is the protection rationale. As
initially explained by the Advisory Committee to the federal rules,
its purpose is "[to] protect a defendant who is in the position of
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually
fall within the charge."' 41 The protection rationale has been
adopted by many courts. 42 It is based on the assumptions that some
innocent defendants will offer guilty pleas, and that these defendants
can be protected if a factual basis is required before their pleas are
accepted. An examination of these assumptions confirms the valid-
ity of the protection rationale.
A central concern of any system of criminal justice is to make
certain that innocent defendants are not convicted.43 Because the
American criminal justice system provides adversarial trials in which
anyone accused of criminal activity may contest his guilt, a pre-
3 5 An "accuracy inquiry" is the process of determining vhat acts and intent can
be attributed to the defendant. If the acts and intent uncovered through the
accuracy inquiry correspond to the elements of the crime to which the plea is offered,
a "factual basis" for the plea is said to exist. In practice, the terms "factual basis"
and "accuracy inquiry" are often used interchangeably.
36 A court must satisfy itself that a factual basis exists. FED. R. CaM1. P. 11(f).
The test is clearly subjective. 1 C. WrmIGT, FEDERAL PrAcI=C AN PaocExuRE
§ 174, at 376 (1969).
07 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465-67 (1969).
8 Id. 467.
3 9 A guilty plea following plea negotiations, by shortening the time between
charge and disposition, "enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of
the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 261 (1971). But see NEw Yons STATE SPECIAL Cosn~MIssI N ON ATriCA,
AmrcA 30-31 (1972).
4 0 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969).
41 Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendment of FED. B. CaM. P. 11.
42 E.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969); Brown v. State,
250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1969); McCall v. State, 9 Md. App. 191, 199, 263 A.2d
19, 25 (1970).
43 See J. B.AwLs, A TBEoRY OF JustcE (1971). "The desired outcome is that
the defendant should be declared guilty if and only if he has committed the offense
with which he is charged." Id. 85. D. NEv;Nn , supra note 2, at 232; Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CoNrEmp. ThoB. 401 (1958).
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sumption arises that innocent defendants will in fact contest charges
lodged against them. Innocent defendants may nonetheless offer
pleas rather than contest their guilt at trial for several reasons.
Innocent pleaders can be divided conceptually into two different
subcategories. Those in the first group, because of the complexity
of the criminal law, erroneously conclude that they have committed
the crime charged although in fact they have not.44  The second
group is comprised of individuals who, because of prior experiences
or pressures applied to them as they are processed through the
criminal justice system, conclude that it is in their best interest to
plead guilty although they know they did not commit the crime
with which they are charged.
A defendant who pleads guilty because of an erroneous con-
clusion regarding his guilt 45 may do so because of one or more
reasons: (1) confusion as to his prior actions,46 (2) failure to under-
stand that criminal liability requires both an act (or omission) and
intent,47 (3) inability to understand that both the act and intent
must be considered criminal,48 (4) failure to understand that there
is no crime unless the act and intent concur,49 (5) failure to realize
in a particular circumstance that transferred intent may not be
applicable, °0 and (6) failure to recognize other appropriate defenses.5 1
An innocent defendant who is aware that he did not commit
the criminal act might nevertheless decide to plead guilty because
of: (1) the potentially overwhelming nature of the evidence against
44 See ABA PNojEacT ON STANDADS FOR C:rmmNAL JusTcE, STANDARDS LELATT-
iNG TO THE PROSEC ON FuCnON AND THE DEFENSE FuNcTION 226-27 (App.
Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS].
45"It is not difficult to imagine an accused standing before the bar of justice
accused of a crime he thinks he committed but really did'not." Estes v. State, 294
So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), aftd, 316 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1975).
46rThe defendant may not remember the details of his allegedly criminal activi-
ties. It is also possible that the defendant in fact previously committed the type of
offense charged, but not at the time and place charged. Because of his confusion
regarding his prior conduct, however, he may erroneously believe that he committed
the act as charged.
47 "[A] man is not punished merely because he has a criminal mind." Smith,
Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 422, 447 (1957).
4 8 See ABA DEFENSE STANmDnRDS, supra note 44.
49See United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961) (subsequent
conversion of innocently accepted overpayment cannot sustain a conviction for
larceny).
5o Transferred intent does not apply if there is a difference between the type of
harm intended and the type of harm resulting. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)
(Official Draft 1962). See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, H-ANDBOOK, ON
CRnmrAL LAw 243-44 (1972).
51 Possible defenses include entrapment, duress, self-defense, defense of another,
and defense of property. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScOrr, supra note 50, at
268-413.
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him; 12 (2) the disparity in punishment between conviction by plea
and conviction at trial; Is (8) a desire to protect family or friends
from prosecution; 14 (4) the conditions of pretrial incarceration; Il
(5) a concern that fuller inquiry at trial may result in disclosure of
additional facts which could increase the sentence in the present case
or result in additional prosecutions; ' (6) a desire to expedite the
proceedings because of feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness, or
despair when faced with the power of the state; 127 (7) pressure from
family, friends, or attorneys; 58 and (8) "ignorance, deception, de-
lusion, feelings of moral guilt, or self-destructive inclinations." 59
Given the fact that innocent defendants do plead guilty,60 an
analysis of the effects of a trial judge's determination that there is
an insufficient factual basis 61 for him to accept a guilty plea indi-
cates whether defendants receive sufficient protection in this manner.
52 See, e.g., State v. Reali, 26 N.J. 222, 139 A.2d 300 (1958) (plea entered
because defendant was told by his attorney that his pretrial escape was tantamount
to signing a confession). For documented cases of innocent defendants who were
convicted at trial, see E. Boaca'u, CONVICTNG THE INNocm-r (1932); J. FhsANx
& B. FRANY, NoT Gumwr (1957).
53 The problem of disparity is a major concern of the sentencing process.
CouRTs, supra note 2, at 23-24. For several views on the desirability of this dis-
parity, compare Pilot Institute on Sentencing: Proceedings, 26 F.R.D. 231, 285-87
(1959) ("willingness [of a defendant] to plead guilty ought not to have any inde-
pendent significance in sentencing." Id. 285), with ABA Piz& STANDAuns, supra
note 2, at § 1.8 ("It is proper for the court to grant charge and sentence concessions
to defendants who enter a plea of guilty...." Id.).
54 See, e.g., Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964) (defendant's
guilty plea entered in exchange for promise that his pregnant wife would be allowed
to plead guilty to a lesser charge); Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (1st Cir.
1959) (plea induced by promise not to prosecute defendant's fiancee).
5 0 See Newbold v. State, 492 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Mo. 1973) (defendant pleaded
guilty in order to be transferred out of city jail); People v. Johnson, 33 App. Div. 2d
573, 305 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1969) (plea entered to obtain hospital treatment for nar-
cotic addiction); White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119
U. PA. L. 1Ev. 439, 444 (1971).
56 A. AmsrnDAm, B. SEGrAL & M. Mnr=s, Tmr.A MANuAL FoR Tm DEFxsE
or Cnm rnrA CAsEs § 202 at 1-189 to 190 (3d ed. 1975).
57 See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 287 A.2d 592, 603 (Me. 1972).
58 See, e.g., People v. Heirens, 4 I11. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955) (pressure from defense attorneys and parents).
GO State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 327, 329, 498 P.2d 149, 151 (1972).
60 Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARv. L. R1Ev. 293, 309-11 (1975). The exact number of innocent
people who plead guilty is uncertain, however. COuRTS, supra note 2, at 108 app.
113.
61 It should be noted that of the situations that might induce innocent defend-
ants to plead guilty, text accompanying notes 52-59 supra, only the overwhelming
nature of the evidence would be likely to produce a sufficient factual basis for a
judge to accept a plea of guilty.
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A guilty plea cannot be accepted in federal court without
demonstration of a factual basis for the plea.62 Therefore, an in-
sufficient factual basis eliminates the option of pleading guilty and
requires a defendant to stand trial. This procedure will be re-
ferred to as the "trial-factual-basis procedure." Some.,states have
adopted the"trial-factual-basis procedure." Others, however, simply
require that a -defendant be notified of the factual basis defect in
his plea, thereby presenting him with the option of standing trial or
having his plea accepted despite the defect.63 This latter procedure
will be referred to as the "notice-factual-basis procedure." Assum-
ing all parties present the truth, the inability to establish a suffi-
cient factual basis might indicate that a defendant's guilt could not
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A finding of insufficient
factual basis is, however, hardly equivalent to a verdict of not guilty.
The defendant may be convicted at trial even though a sufficient
factual basis could not be established-for the plea. This may be so
either because the 'information presented for factual basis purposes
was less than the admissible evidence available for trial,6 or because
conflicts among sources of information used to establish a factual
basis, which would preclude the judge from accepting the plea,65
might be resolyed against the defendant at trial. The protection
afforded the defendant by the factual basis requirement, therefore,
does not mean that every innocent defendant will avoid conviction.
Rather, it means only that those defendants who, prior to the factual
basis inquiry, were not aware that their conduct did not fall within
the charge are either forced to trial, or are put on notice that they
possibly could be acquitted at trial, and are required to choose
between a plea or trial. It does not guarantee that those who go to
trial will be acquitted; nor does it guarantee that they will not be
subjected to a harsher penalty for unsuccessfully attempting to prove
their innocence.66
A discussion of innocence, of course, can be approached from
either a factual or legal perspective. For the purposes of this
62FED: R. Cnmm. P.-11(f).
63 "If after proper notice defendant nevertheless wishes to convict himself, the
court can accept the plea." Comment, Judical Supervision Over California Plea
Bargaining: Regulating the Trade, 59 CAL. L. REv. 962, 981 (1971). See People
v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 309-10, 206 N.E.2d 330, 332-33, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380,'
389-90 (1965).
64 Not all witnesses who could be called to testify at trial are likely to be
present at the plea proceeding.
65 See note 274 infra & accompanying text.
66 See note 53 supra.
[Vol. 126:88
Article, factual innocence means that an accused's conduct cannot
be defined as criminal. In other words, a defendant is factually
innocent if he did not commit a voluntary act (or omission) with
the requisite intent; conversely, he is factually guilty if he did.
Legal innocence, on the other hand, is defined as either a dismissal
of the charges for a reason of law 67 or a verdict of not guilty re-
turned by the trier of fact. An accused is legally innocent if the
trier of fact concludes that the admissible evidence does not prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence does so prove,
the defendant is legally guilty. In this sense, the legal definition
of guilt or innocence is defined by the judicial process.6
An interrelationship between fact and law exists in all criminal
trials. Frequently fact and law correspond perfectly; factually in-
nocent defendants are found legally innocent. The legal outcome,
however, does not always coincide with the factual event. Through
policy decisions to employ such concepts as the presumption of in-
nocence, reasonable doubt, burden of proof, and the exclusionary
rules of evidence, the criminal justice system has been designed to
ensure that as many factually innocent defendants as possible will be
protected from conviction, even though those policy decisions result
in some factually guilty defendants being found legally innocent.69
Independent of such policy decisions, discrepancies between fact and
legal outcome may stem from mistakes in decisionmalding processes.70
As a result, some factually innocent defendants will be found
legally guilty; some factually guilty defendants will be found legally
innocent. Although finding a factually guilty defendant legally
innocent is a type of mistake tolerable in an adversary system that
seeks to preserve the dignity of the individual as well as to pursue
truth, finding a factually innocent defendant legally guilty is un-
acceptable. The criminal justice system must implement procedural
protections in order to prevent such malfunctions.
67 For example, double jeopardy considerations may require the dismissal of
charges against defendants who are factually guilty.
68 [The defendant] is [legally] guilty if and only if [the] factual determi-
nations are made in procedurally regular fashion and by authorities acting
within competences duly allocated-to them. Furthermore, he is not to be
held [legally] guilty, even though the factual determination is or might be
adverse to him, if various rules designed to protect him and to safeguard
the integrity of the process are not given effect: . - . jurisdiction . . .
venue . . . statute of limitations . . . double jeopardy . . criminal
responsibility ....
H. PA CKE, supra note 8, at 166.
69 Id. 167; Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law,
1970 DutE L.J. 919, 927 (1970).
7 0 See E. BoRaIW, CoNvIwCIG -bNocENV (1932); J. FmA x & B. FhANK,
Nor GuiLTY (1957).
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Because legal guilt is usually determined by the waiver of trial
and a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,71 a defendant's willingness
to offer a plea does not insure that legal guilt is based on factual
guilt. A ,factual basis requirement, -however can protect those
pleaders who are innocent in either fact or law3 2
The subgroup of defendants who erroneously conclude that
they were factually guilty but who would be acquitted at trial
would certainly benefit from a factual basis requirement. They
will be acquitted at a trial required under a trial-factual-basis pro-
cedure; under a notice-factual-basis procedure they will be given
notice of their possible legal innocence and the opportunity to stand
trial and be acquitted. Those people who are both factually and
legally innocent but lack the strength to seek their legal innocence
must stand trial under a trial-factual-basis procedure; under a
notice-factual-basis procedure they will be given the opportunity to
make- a more realistic evaluation of their situation. Those people
who are both factually and legally innocent but see a greater benefit
in a plea than a trial would still be able to exercise that option
under a notice-factual-basis procedure.
The probability -of establishing the legal innocence of the
factually innocent defendant who decides to plead guilty under the
above-mentioned circumstances is sufficiently great, and the damage
to the legal systemby allowing him to be convicted albeit by his
own plea is so severe, that all federal and many state courts require
the accuracy inquiry for felony pleas. The application of such a
procedure should be extended to all criminal pleas. Indeed, the
accuracy inquiry would accomplish its purpose even more fre-
quently with misdemeanor pleas.
IV. IMPORTANCE OF THE AcCuRAcY INQUIRY
FOR MISDEMEANORS
The accuracy inquiry is even more necessary for people accused
of misdemeanors rather than felonies.' A misdemeanor defendant
is less likely to receive any significant benefit by offering a guilty
71 See note 2 supra & accompanying text.
72 It has generally been assumed that there is no way of determining how many
factually innocent defendants who plead guilty would be acquitted if they went to
trial. One study, however, has concluded that up to one third of all defendants
pleading guilty would escape conviction by going to trial. See Finkelstein, supra
note 60 at 309-10. A trial-factual-basis procedure, of course, would be detrimental
to a defendant convicted at trial despite his factual innocence, to the extent that he
suffers sentence disparity. See note 53 supra. In this sense, the trial-factual-basis
procedure either purposefully neglects or fails to recognize the plight of those
defendants who are factually innocent but would be legally guilty.
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plea. He appears in a type of court that historically has rendered
less protection to those charged with a misdemeanor than to those
accused of a felony.
A factually innocent defendant charged with a felony may
rationally choose to plead guilty in certain circumstances. The
overwhelming nature of the evidence against him may lead him to
conclude either that he would be convicted at trial,78 or that the
probable sentence disparity between plea and trial is so great that
it is in his best interests to offer a plea. Although a felony de-
fendant may see distinct benefits in a negotiated plea, a defendant
initially charged with a misdemeanor is already charged with the
least severe category of crime in the jurisdiction. As a result, the
usual benefits associated with a negotiated plea will not be available.
Although the Supreme Court has sustained guilty pleas offered by
felons who simultaneously proclaimed their innocence when the
plea was offered at the suggestion of competent counsel who hoped
to limit the possible penalty, 4 if no conclusive benefit could be
achieved by offering a plea, a court should scrutinize the factual
basis exactingly. This would be the case with nearly every mis-
demeanor charge. When the original charge is a misdemeanor,
virtually no formal plea negotiation occurs; 75 the small range of
sentence lengths offers little opportunity for tacit bargaining.
Therefore, when a notice-factual-basis procedure is employed, a
defendant who learns that there is no factual basis for his crime will
more likely opt for a trial in a misdemeanor case.
In addition to the minimal benefit of a plea in a misdemeanor
case, other characteristics of misdemeanor courts suggest the im-
portance of an accuracy inquiry in that context. Even though de-
fendants charged with misdemeanors enjoy most of the consti-
tutional rights guaranteed to defendants charged with felonies, 76
73The defendant in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), for example,
had a long prior criminal record which included convictions for murder, armed
robbery (nine times), transporting stolen goods, forgery, and carrying a concealed
weapon. Although a jury would have been instructed to consider the prior convic-
tions only on the issue of credibility and not as substantive evidence, they might
have been hard pressed to do so. Such an instruction would amount to "[a] recom-
mendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
74 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
75 THE PausmENT's CO miIssIoN ON LAW EN oncamnxr AND A)mmNrsnATLoN
or JusrcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRVME IN A FREE Socry 134 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as CHALLENGE oF CPmE].
76 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel when imprison-
ment is imposed); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to tran-
script for purposes of appeal); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)
(right to confront one's accusers); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892)
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differing procedures have been justified on the basis of the conse-
quences, complexity, and volume of misdemeanor cases. It has been
said that the consequence is mild,77 the complexity slight, and the
volume overburdening.
Misdemeanors are often referred to as "petty" offenses, but
"petty" is a misleading term.7 8 A closer examination discloses that
the consequences of being convicted of a "petty" offense are not at
all, trivial. 9, From the point of view of the individual defendant, a
misdemeanor conviction has significant, long-lasting deleterious
effects. The length, conditions, and consequences of imprisonment,
as well as the lingering status of "misdemeanant," are far from
trivial. "[T]he prospect of imprisonment for however short a time
will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or petty matter
and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his
career and reputation." 80 To look only at the length of incarcera-
tion provided by the misdemeanor statute as a measure of the
seriousness of the consequences of conviction may be a deceptive
measure of severity because a misdemeanant's incarceration may
exceed the apparent, statutory limit by a considerable amount.
Conviction may lead to consecutive sentences if the defendant was
charged with, multiple counts.81 Moreover, conviction may be an
automatic violation of felony probation or parole, subjecting the
defendant to a long prison term. 2
Regardless of its length, the severity of a misdemeanor in-
carceration may be attributable to the place of incarceration. Al-
though the conditions of any prison may be unpleasant, the mis-
(privilege against self-incrimination). The major constitutional difference is in the
right to trial by jury. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
77 E.g., People v. Tomlinson, 50 Mich. App. 655, 659, 213 N.W.2d 803, 805
(1973).
78 "Generally speaking, petty offenses are a sub-group of misdemeanors; that is,
a felony is necessarily a major crime, but a misdemeanor may be either a major
crime or a petty offense depending on the possible punishment." W. LAFAvE &
A. ScoTT, supra note 51, at 33.
79 Although the offense might be termed "petty" with respect to the "type of
offenses and to the penalties imposed, it nevertheless has a tremendous impact on
citizens having their first and perhaps only contact with the criminal justice system."
Oliphant, Reflections on the Lower Court System: The Development of a Unique
Clinical Misdemeanor and a Public Defender Program, 57 MM'N. L. RBv. 545, 546
(1973).
8OBaldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
8 1 See, e.g., Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash. 2d 142, 456 P.2d 696, cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1969), overruled on other grounds, 85 Wash. 704, 538 P.2d
499 (1975).
82 See Sweeton v. Sneddon, 324 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Utah 1971) (defendant
faced a penalty of up to six months and/or a $300 fine on misdemeanor conviction,
and was subject to imprisonment for as long as 17 years and five months if his felony
parole was revoked).
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demeanant's place of incarceration may be far worse than the
felon's. In most states misdemeanants are incarcerated in local
jails. Although state and federal prisons have been severely crid-
cized,13 the conditions of many local jails are far worse than those
of even the most inadequate state and federal institutions. In-
carceration may subject the misdemeanant to "deplorable living
conditions" 84 in jails that are often little more than the ill-equipped
remnants of the last century, manned by untrained people with few
professional skills.85 Structural and personnel deficiences are not
the only problems. Health care is often minimal or nonexistent; s1
a prisoner may be subject to threats of violence, sexual assaults, s7
and suicidal pressures.8
In addition to curtailing liberty, incarceration can mean the
loss of employment, creating financial hardships for a defendant and
his family.89 The community may eventually suffer from a mis-
demeanant's association with felons during pre-trial incarceration."0
83 See, e.g., Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp.
362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
s4 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 (1972). Jail conditions have been
found to violate "basic standards of human decency, not some mere gastideous
squeamishness or private sentimentalism." Brenaman v. Hadigan, 343 F. Supp. 128,
133 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Local jail conditions have raised serious eighth amendment
constitutional questions, M. H.miAN, PmsoNmIs Rcwnrs SounCEBoox 114-15 (1973),
and have been the subject of class action suits attempting to rectify these conditions.
See, e.g., Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Lucas, 391 Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910
(1974).
8 5 See R. CQ.Ax, CmAiE n AmEUcA 216 (1970). In a report on the rehabili-
tative services available to the lower courts, the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency surveyed 250 counties in 50 states, excluding institutions in which
offenders were kept less than 30 days. The survey showed that institutions average
one psychologist for 4,282 inmates, one vocational teacher for every 1,031 inmates,
one academic teacher for 1,333 inmates, one psychiatrist for every 2,436 inmates, one
social worker for every 846 inmates, and one custodial officer for nine inmates. Of
these officers, 51.7% were paid $5,000 a year or less starting salary, and another
25.3% were paid a starting salary of between $5,001 and $6,000 a year. National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Correction in the United States, in 13 Cumni
AND DmzQu cNy 142, 145 (1967).
86 See A-mzl CA BAn AssocrImoN in conjunction with A mucAx MEDIcAL
AssocmAo, MEDhcAL Am HnEqLrn CARE n JAmls, PusoNs AN--D OTHR Comac-
TioNAL FA.cmrrzs (1973); LAw ENFoncmmrr ASSiSTANcE ADnmSTRAT-ON, SUR=vE
OF INmATES OF LoCAL JAIms, 1972, at 8 (Advance Report 1974). Seven out of
eight of the jails surveyed had no medical facilities.
87 See, e.g., Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1973); Pugh v.
Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Van Horn v. Lukhard, 302 F. Supp.
384 (E.D. Va. 1975).
88See B. GOLDFAB, JAILS: Tim ULTIMATE GHEro, 105-12, 124-25, 286,
300-01 (1975).
89 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.6 (1972).
9 0 See Platt, An Odd Couple, The Criminal Sanction and the Municipal Ordi-
nance, 7 WILmrImE L.J. 43, 59 (1971).
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Lessons learned in the "school of crime" '9 may make a defendant
more likely to commit additional, more serious, crimes in the future.
Not all misdemeanor convictions result in jail terms, however.
A common sentence for a misdemeanor conviction is a fine 92 which
may be significant.98 In addition to the obvious financial burden, a
defendant's inability or refusal to pay a fine may result in a jail
sentence.94 In addition to a. fine or incarceration, other direct
criminal consequences of conviction may include the imposition of
stringent conditions of probation for a period of years,95 and more
serious punishment for a subsequent offense. 96
Indirect civil consequences 97 of misdemeanor convictions in-
clude the loss of driving privileges 9 and disqualification for licensed
professions.9 9 Considerable stigma also may be attached to some
misdemeanor convictions,10 0 regardless of the sentence received.
The stigma of dishonesty, violence, or moral depravity may do
incalculable damage to a person's reputation. Even with relatively
non-stigmatizing offenses, the fact that the charge appears on police
records, which may be furnished to prospective employers, is a sig-
nificant disability.
,91 See Flynn, jails and Criminal Justice, in PamsoNmis IN AmmC&A (L. Ohlin
ed. 1973); R. CLRiu, CPnvm iN AmBIcA 216 (1970).92 Lower courts have a reputation of being revenue producers, with an emphasis
on profits, not justice. The slogan "Let the cash registers ring with justice" demon-
strates the point. Rossum, Problems in Municipal Court Administration and the
Stress of Supreme Court Decisions: A Memphis Case Study, 3 AM. J. CGnu. L. 53,
71 (1974>.
93 Many "petty" offenses are punishable by a fine of up to $500, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970), an amount that can hardly be described as de minimus.
94 "A fine will have little beneficial effect if it is levied on an individual who
does not have the ability to pay. A large proportion of offenders confined in local
jails are there for non-payment of fines." NA-oNoAL Anvisony CommnissroN ON
CnmNrAL JusTcE STm Dmns AND GoALs, Co=a=cToNs 163 (1973).
9 5 See Note, Limitations Upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of
Probation, 8 GA. L. Ev. (1974). Michigan, for example, permits the imposition
of-two years of probation for a misdemeanor which has a maximum incarceration of
90 days. MIcH. Comp. LAws A'm. § 771.2 (1967).
96 See, e.g., MxcE. Compa. LAws ANNi. § 257.625, 257.625(b) (1976).
97 See Note, Limiting Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a
Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal Proceedings, 61 VA. L. 1lw.
1454, 1489 n.201 (1975); Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAN. L. REv. 929 (1970).
9 8 E.g., Mica. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.319 (1976).
99 E.g., MmcH. Comp. LAws ANNt. §§ 338.1812, 750.428 (1967) (physicians and
surgeons); see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring). See generally Bromberger, Rehabilitation and Occupational Licensing:
A Conflict of Interests, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 794 (1972).
100 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); James v. Hedley,
410 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1969). See Taylor, The Supreme Court, the Individual,
and the Criminal Process, 1 G .L. REv. 386, 434 (1967).
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. Furthermore, although misdemeanors involve a shorter max-
imum incarceration than felonies they are not necessarily less com-
plex and therefore less deserving of protection for defendants so
charged. Crimes are classified by the degree of social harm rather
than by the complexity of proof; therefore, the evidence required
for some misdemeanor convictions may be as complex as for felony
convictions. In fact, thirty percent of all misdemeanors are simply
less serious counterparts of felonies that present legal and factual
issues of equal difficulty.10' Misdemeanor cases also present no
dearth of constitutional issues.
As the Supreme Court noted in Sibron v. New York,10 2 "[m]any
deep and abiding constitutional problems are encountered pri-
marily at the level of 'low visibility' in the criminal process in the
context that prosecutions are 'minor offenses' which carry only
short sentences." 103 Certainly the forty percent of all misde-
meanors referred to as "social nuisance" offenses 104 can present
substantial issues and may "often bristle with thorny constitutional
questions." 105
The complexity of misdemeanor cases is further illustrated by
the degree to which the conduct resulting in misdemeanor prosecu-
tion is subject to discretionary interpretations by the police and
prosecutors,1 6 even though constitutionally protected activity is
often involved. 0 7 Police investigative functions in the misdemeanor
area may lead to constitutional violations. Although only a small
percentage of misdemeanor cases are appealed, 08 numerous mis-
demeanor cases do reach the Supreme Court.0 9 The fact that mis-
101 CounTs, supra note 2, at 55 (referring to simple assault and petty larceny).
102 392 U.S. 41 (1968).
103 Id. 52.
104 CoTJTS, supra note 2, at 55.
105 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972).
10 6 See generally K. Dvis, POLICE DiscnoN (1975); K. DAvis, Discm-roN-
AlY JusncE: A PptELmiNAYY INQUmY (1969).
107 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
108 See Note, The De Novo Procedure-Assessment of Its Constitutionality
Under the Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 55 BosToN U.L. REv. 25, 51 (1975) (in 1973 a little
more than one percent of the people convicted in Massachusetts lower courts ap-
pealed to a trial de novo); S. BING & S. RossFmRm., THE QuAnrry Or JusncE IN
'aE LowFR Cmun5AL Cotrs or MmaoPorrAN BosroN 97 (1970) (in 1968, 20%
appealed in Boston). Cf. Mileski, Courtroom Encounters: An Observation of a
Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAw & Soc'y REV. 473, 480 (1971) ("One possible expla-
nation of why so few misdemeanor convictions are appealed is that many misde-
meanants do not know they have a right to appeal." Id.).
109 E.g., North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976); City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976); Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); Ward v.
City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
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demeanors appear to be disproportionately underrepresented in
appellate courts is probably due to the misdemeanant's inability to
get his case to the appellate court rather than the absence of im-
portant issues.
Despite the seriousness and complexity of misdemeanor charges,
the legal procedures employed in misdemeanor and felony courts
and the training and competence of those who employ them differ
significantly. A defendant charged with a misdemeanor receives
fewer procedural protections in every step of the criminal process.
His case receives less judicial scrutiny and therefore less verification
of his guilt than that of the accused felon. Case investigation tends
to be minimal or nonexistent because the police and prosecutors are
overburdened with felony cases. In some jurisdictions police offi-
cers have full discretion to charge a person with a misdemeanor; 110
as a result, an individual may be accused of a crime and required
to appear in court before any person with legal training reviews his
case. Inside the courthouse, the distinction remains. Both the
prosecutor and the defense attorney, when they are used, may be
relatively inexperienced,'" and the lower court judge may be a lay
person with no legal training. 12  In addition to the minimal train-
ing and experience of personnel who process misdemeanor cases,
there are fewer screening procedures to weed out cases where the
defendant either should not have been charged or where his case
should have been dismissed at a pretrial stage. There is no grand
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Coates v. Cin-
cinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Groppi v. Wis-
consin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968);
Schmerber v. California, 385 U.S. 757 (1966); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382
U.S. 87 (1965); Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1984); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199
(1960); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
lOF. Mun, PRosEcunoN 9-10 (1970); Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal
Process of Cook County and the Indigent Defendant, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 584, 608-10;
f. Note, The Municipal Court Misdemeanor Arraignment Procedure of Hamilton
County, Ohio: An Empirical Study, 41"U. CuIN. L. REv. 623, 635 (1972) (court
clerks issue charges without judicial approval).
lil Misdemaeanor public defenders are frequently new lawyers or candidates for
admission to the state bar. Misdemeanants are also represented by students prac-
ticing under student practice rules. S. KRANrz, C. Smrnr, D. RossAx, P. FnoyD
& J. HoFF'Amw, hainT TO Cousm i CRn m.r CASES 165 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as S. KEAluz]. Police officers act as prosecutors in some jurisdictions for
misdemeanor offenses. S. BINa & S. RosmfF=, supra note 108, at 29; CourTs,
supra note 2, at 30.
112 See North v. Rssell, 427 U.S. 328, 333 n.4 (1976).
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jury "Is or preliminary examination. 14 Additionally, there is little
or no motion practice,"5 and whatever discovery procedures exist
are mainly informal.'" In some jurisdictions a defendant is ex-
pected to plead or stand trial on the same day as the initial arraign-
ment.17  Trials are often much speedier for misdemeanors." 8  Fre-
quently sentencing immediately follows conviction; as a result, pre-
sentence reports are seldom prepared."19
The procedural disparities between felony and misdemeanor
administration are not mitigated by greater consultation between
the misdemeanor defendant and his attorney. Although all in-
digents charged with felonies have the right to court-appointed
counsel, 20 only some indigents charged with misdemeanors share
that right. Argersinger v. Hamlin 121 extended the right to counsel
to an indigent misdemeanant who is sentenced to jail. 22 Because in-
carceration is not the most frequently imposed sanction, however,
most indigents charged with misdemeanors need not be offered
counsel. 23
Differences in the procedures for appointment of counsel fur-
ther exacerbate the distinctions in the sixth amendment right to
counsel depending on whether the charge is a felony or misde-
meanor. Felony courts routinely appoint counsel, whereas mis-
demeanor courts merely offer counsel. The difference is substantial.
Virtually all eligible accused felons receive assistance of counsel, but
many eligible accused misdemeanants do not. The manner in
113 Indictment is not required, at least in federal practice, for misdemeanors
punishable by fine or local jail confinement. See Duke v. United States, 301 U.S.
492 (1937).
"34 See FED. R. Cnf. P. 5(c).
115 ROUGH JuSTm, supra note 33, at xxv; see S. BnTG & S. RosENF=, supra
note 108, at 78-79 (10 written motions in 2,000 cases).
116 See Discovery in Criminal Cases: Denial to Misdemeanants as a Violation of
Due Process and Equal Protection, 65 J. Cnmi. L. & Cm~R. 181 (1974).
117 See Conars, supra note 2, at 30; Note, supra note 110, at 623.
118 See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv.
385 (1951).
119 CoumTs, supra note 2, at 31; S. KEANZ, supra note 111, at 184; Platt, An
Odd Couple: The Criminal Sanction and the Municipal Ordinance, 7 WnmAmrr
L.J. 43, 56 (1971).
120 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
121407 U.S. 25 (1972).
122 Id. 37. The Supreme Court expressed the right in the negative: "We hold,
therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned
for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial" Id. No jurisdiction apparently has attempted
to distinguish the plea stage from trial.
123 Some courts, however, such as the Misdemeanor Division of Detroit Re-
corder's Court, offer counsel to every indigent without a prior determination whether
incarceration is a likely disposition.
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which the offer is made becomes crucial. The predisposition of the
offeree and differences-either conscious or unconscious-in the
manner of delivering the offer result in far fewer eligible misde-
meanants accepting counsel than the number so entitled.124
Even where counsel is present, the protections afforded de-
fendants are not as great as imagined. 125 In the past the presence
of counsel created the assumptions that the criminal process was
fair,126 and that a guilty plea was truthful, based on- consent, and
entered with an awareness of the consequences. 7 These assump-
tions are no longer held in the federal courts, however, as evidenced
by the stringent mandate of rule 11. It is equally unfounded in
state courts as to guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases. Attorneys who
represent misdemeanants have far more clients, and consequently
must spend less time per client, than those who represent felons. 28
A high client-attorney ratio is the rule for both the public defender
and the private attorney. The economics of the system demands
this higher ratio to obtain more representation in dollar terms from
the salaried public defender. Private attorneys also find that the
high ratio enables them to run supermarket style law offices-high
volume, quick turnover, and low margin.129 Lawyers hardly spend
the time to learn their clients' names, much less discuss consti-
tutional rights and defenses. This abbreviated lawyer-client rela-
12 4 See S. KANTz, supra note 111, at 381; L. Sn.vxas~m, DE sE OF THE
POOR 3ws Csm L CASES iN A.mmcA STATE Courrs 89 (1965); Mileski, supra
note 108, at 482, 484.
125 See Ingtaham, The Impact of Argersinger-One Year Later, 8 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 615, 623 (1974); Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43
WASH. L. REv. 685, 699 (1968). In fact, a person charged with a misdemeanor
may be better off without counsel. One study has shown that defendants who
waive counsel receive more lenient treatment than those who insist upon the assign-
ment of counsel. See S. BrNs & S. Rosuu-Er., supra note 108, at 53 (defendants
without counsel are found not guilty more often and, if found guilty, receive a fine
rather than a jail sentence more often than defendants with counsel).
'26 See 97 A.L.1L2d 549 (1964); D. NmvAw, supra note 2, at 226-27.
.127 D. NEwMAN, supra note 2, at 51, 200.
128 Full-time defenders average 483 misdemeanor cases per year. NAToNAL
LEGAL Am AND DEmNDER AssoCATIoN, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSMcE 29 (1973).
The recommended caseload maximum is 400 misdemeanors per year, or 150 felonies.
NATrmAL Anvsony CoMMIssioN. ON CRIMNAL JusTcE STANDADs AND GoAIS,
CouRTs 276 (1973). Defenders reported, on an average, that they thought only
295 misdemeanor defendants, or 140 felony defendants, can be effectively repre-
sented by a single, full-time attorney. See generally Comment, Caseload Ceilings
on Indigent Defense Systems to Insure Effective Assistance of Counsel, 43 U. CINN.
L. REv. 185 (1974).
'
29 Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 1, 9-11
(1973). A plea of guilty may be as remunerative for the defense lawyer as a full
day of trial. In Michigan appointed counsel is paid $100 for a full day of trial and
$100 for a guilty plea. Rule 14.13, Rules of the Circuit Court for the County-of
Wayne, in MicmGAN GEN. CT. RuLEs.
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tionship, frequently occurring under circumstances where a de-
fendant is assumed to be guilty,1 0 results in a mass-produced system
of justice that encourages a defendant to plead guilty.
Under present practices a defendant who pleads guilty to a
misdemeanor charge can be convicted without any verification of
guilt by someone with the legal expertise to do so. As a result, the
ultimate determination of whether a crime has been committed is
made by the defendant or the defense counsel rather than by the.
court. The defendant, who has an obvious interest in not subject-
ing himself to punishment, does not have the legal expertise to make
that determination; the defense counsel, who may have adequate
legal expertise, frequently does not share that interest.131 For many
reasons the defense counsel may owe greater allegiance to the
bureaucratic structure of the lower court than to his own client. 132"
Participation in fewer trials may be economically advantageous to
him, 133 or perhaps reduce his conflicts with the enforcement system
of which he has become a quasi-member. This misplaced loyalty
may cause a defense attorney to persuade his client to offer a plea,
although a trial would be a defendant's better course of action.1 34
The creation of misdemeanor public defender offices will not
necessarily provide more effective protection for defendants. Sur-
prisingly, public defenders seem to enter guilty pleas at approxi-
mately the same rate as private attorneys. 35 Some defenders even
tend to exalt their ability to procure pleas.' 36 Although defender
offices would seem to be most resistant to pressures exerted by
130 See Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. or CoNrEcr
BESoLuno- 52, 62 (1967); Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the
Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SocIAL ThoBz.zms 225 (1964).
131 To say that a defendant's lawyer may not share that defendant's interest in
acquittal runs counter to a central hypothesis of the adversary system. It is generally
assumed that a lawyer's interest is with his client, not with the court, nor with
opposing counsel. It is further assumed that the lawyer only allows his client to
offer a plea when the lawyer believes the plea to be in the client's best interest.
Although a defense attorney should zealously represent his client, because of bureau-
cratic pressures, "able, conscientious and highly motivated attorneys . . . make
decisions that are not in their clients' interests." Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YAIx L.J. 1179, 1180 (1975).
132 Blumberg, Covert Contingencies in the Right to the Assistance of Counsel,
20 VAND. L. REV. 581, 587-88 (1967).
133 The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 Hxav. L. Mav. 148, 152 (1970).
134 Blumberg, supra note 132, at 602. "Of course, the defense attorney's
inclination to offer a plea, which may be in opposition to the defendant's best
interest, is never communicated directly as being the defense attorney's interest.
The lawyer attempts to convince the defendant that it is in the defendant's best
interest to plead." Id.
135 Alschuler, supra note 131, at 1206.
130 Id.
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enforcement- systems, 87 the creation of defender offices -nd the re-
sulting improvement of the court system often results in but a more
sophisticated apparatus for, processing a defendant towards a guilty
plea.188  - I I I , ;
-Although patient judges with sufficient expertise might be able
to compensate for the procedural deficiencies in the lower-courts,
the present caliber of many of those judges precludes such a result.
The integrity of the criminal justice system during the plea process
depends upon the judge; 19 misdemeanor judges frequently do not
have the expertise to perform this fuhction. Many states allow
lay people to sit as lower court judges. 40 The Supreme Court re-
cently held that a trial before a lay judgeis not a -violation of a
defendant's rights under the federal constitution if defendants are
entitled to a trial de, novo before a higher court with a lawyer-
judge,' 4 ' notwithstanding the severe criticism of such courts in
contemporary studies. 4 2
The procedural disparities in the lower courts have deleterious
effects on both an individual and societal ,level. When a lower
court -focuses on expediting its docket instead of safeguarding the
rights of a defendant, notions of fundamental fairness are violated.
Furthermore, the individual's chances oftrehabilitation are reduced.
Although the greatest opportunity for diverting a person from a
career of crime and revolving-door appearances in court occurs at
the individual's first contact with the law-usually a misdemeanor
proceeding '43-the current caliber of lower courts does little to
foster that goal. As the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice observed, "[t]he many persons
who encounter these courts each year can hardly fail to interpret
the experience as an expression of indifference to their situations
and the ideals of fairness, equality, and rehabilitation professed in
theory." -44
On a societal level, the importance of misdemeanor cases lies
in their magnitude; approximately four to five million misdemeanor
137 Junker, supra note 125, at 702.
188 See Blumberg, supra note 132, at 605.
139 See D. NEwMAN, supra note 2, at 235; The Supreme Court, 19.69 Term,
84 HAnv. L. REv. 148, 152 (1970).
140 North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 333 n.4 (1916).
'141 Id. 339.
142 See id. 340 n.2 & studies cited therein (Stewart, J., dissenting).
143 COURTS, supra note 2, at 29.
144 Id.
[Vol. 12.6:88
GUILTY PLEAS
cases occur each year, exclusive of traffic offenses.145 More people
receive firsthand information about the criminal justice system in
the misdemeanor court than in any other forum. 46 Current mis-
demeanor procedures are detrimental to the image and integrity of
the criminal process. "[A] system that treats the defendants who are
charged with minor offenses with less dignity and consideration
than it treats those who are charged with serious crimes is hard to
justify." 147
One method to ameliorate the situation in the misdemeanor
courts would be the institution of an accuracy requirement for all
guilty pleas. Before turning to a proposal for an accuracy inquiry
applicable to guilty pleas in both felonies and misdemeanors, the
development of the accuracy inquiry and the current state of the
law regarding it will be surveyed.
V. DEVELOPMENT Or THE AccuRAcy INQUIRY
A. Evolution
Prior to 1966 inquiries regarding the accuracy of guilty pleas
were made by certain judges in both state and federal courts. 4 8
The question whether a factual basis should be required for a
valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere did not attract much atten-
tion, however, until 1966 when a factual basis became mandatory
for pleas of guilty in federal courts through an amendment to
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.14 9 After three
145 Id. 29, 47, 55; Report of the Conference of Legal Manpower Needs of
Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D. 389, 392 (1966).
146 It is estimated that 90% of the criminal cases in this country are misde-
meanors. Courrs, supra note 2, at 29.
147 CHAL.ENGE OF CmBrE, supra note 75, at 129.
148 See Note, Revised Federal Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal
Cases, 44 FontDHN L. Ev. 1010, 1021 n.96 (1976); Note, The Trial Judge's
Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 VAsH. U.L.Q. 306, 308-19.
149 Prior to 1966, rule 11 provided:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty,
and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is
made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of
not guilty.
As amended in 1966, the rule provided:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty,
and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first
addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the conse-
1971
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years of lower federal court experience with the rule, the Supreme
Court first addressed the factual basis issue in McCarthy v. United
States.50 In McCarthy the Court discussed the relationship between
voluntariness and the factual basis determination,"5' emphasizing
the protective function performed by the factual basis require-
ment.;15 2 The factual basis issue, however, was not discussed in the
context of McCarthy's case.5 s Instead the Court, acting under its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts, 5 4 held that
McCarthy should be afforded an opportunity to plead anew because
the trial judge's noncompliance with rule 11 deprived him of "the
Rule's procedural safeguards that are designed to facilitate a more
accurate determination of the voluntariness of his plea." 155 The
trial court judge had failed to address McCarthy personally and to
inquire whether he understood the nature of the charge and was
aware of the consequences of his plea. The Court did indicate,
however, that the voluntariness and factual basis requirements are
inextricably linked, finding that a guilty plea "cannot be truly vol-
untary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law
in relation to the facts." 151 The Court interpreted rule 11 to re-
quences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses
to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the
court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment
upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for
the plea.
The 1966 amendment added the conditions that the judge personally address
the defendant, include the defendant's understanding of the consequences' of the
plea as an element in determining voluntariness, and be satisfied that a factual basis
for the plea existed. For the present version of the rule regarding accuracy, see
note 5 supra. 1 .
150 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
151 Id. 466.
152 Id. 467.
153 The Court noted that
The Government agrees with the Court of Appeals that the record of
the September 14 sentencing hearing demonstrates that the District Judge
satisfied himself by examining the presentence report that there was a
factual basis for the plea. However, because of the Government's conces-
sion at oral argument that the judge did not inquire whether petitioner
understood the nature of the charge, and because of our holding that any
noncompliance with Rule 11 is reversible error, we need not consider the
Government's contention that the record adequately supports the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the district judge satisfied himself that there was a
factual basis for the plea.
Id. 464 n.9.
154 Id. 464.
155 Id. 471-72.
'56 Id. 466 (footnote omitted). This language and subsequent interpretations
of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970), have become the basis for the argument that a factual basis inquiry
is an element of due process and therefore is a federal constitutional requirement
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quire not only that a judge personally inquire whether a defendant
understands the nature of the charge against him and whether he is
aware of the consequences of his plea, but also that a judge per-
sonally ascertain whether a factual basis for the plea exists in order
for the plea to be valid.571
Although none of the constitutional arguments were reached
in McCarthy,'58 the decision had widespread impact in both federal
and state courts. Bound by the Supreme Court's supervisory power,
federal judges were required to accept pleas in a manner that would
insure the existence of a factual basis for each guilty plea. Reacting
to the substance of this policy decision by the Court, a majority of
the states reformed their plea procedures by adding a factual basis
requirement.r 0
In the year following McCarthy, the Court decided whether a
state court could accept a plea of guilty when the pleader pro-
claimed his innocence in North Carolina v. Alford.10 The Court
reasoned that
while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial
and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not
a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal
penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily,
knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.1°6
The Court held that it is not constitutional error for a court to
accept a guilty plea containing a protestation of innocence if the
defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require the entry
for a valid plea. See Heberling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 Lwicows
L. REv. 137, 181-83 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 Hanv. L. REv. 7,
184-85 (1969). Although such a conclusion would lead to one goal of the proposed
accuracy standard-application of the accuracy inquiry in all jurisdictions for all
types of crimes-it would still fail to resolve questions concerning the appropriate
form for the accuracy inquiry. Although finding the constitutional argument quite
persuasive, this Article bases its proposal on broad policy arguments applicable
regardless of the constitutional necessity of an accuracy inquiry.
157 394 U.S. at 467.
158 Id. 464.
159 See note 6 supra.
160 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Harry Alford was charged with first-degree murder
and, following a conviction by trial, would be punished by death under the existing
North Carolina law unless the jury recommended that the punishment be life im-
prisonment. Alford pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of second-degree
murder and thereby was eligible for, and received, the maximum penalty of thirty
years' imprisonment. For Alford's tender of his guilty plea and protestation of
innocence, see id. 28 n.2.
161 Id. 37.
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of the plea,162 and 'if the record before the judge contains a "strong
factual basis" for .the plea. 63  The Court thus permitted, but did
not require, the states to accept pleas from defendants who claim
innocence when a strong factual basis for the plea is established.
164
The states were thus allowed to develop their own rules whether to
accept such pleas,6 5 and many have since done so. 66
McCarthy and Alford'lay a foundation for the development-of
accuracy inquiry procedures by underlining the purpose of the
factual basis requirement and by setting the threshold for, when it
is invoked: a factual basis is required for all pleas of guilty in
federal courts and for pleas of guilty in state courts when the de-
fendant protests his innocence; the Court has not required a factual
basis for state pleas when the defendant admits guilt. The task of
developing the parameters for the accuracy inquiry has been left to
the states and lower federal courts.,
B. Resistance
'Many jurisdictions ,still do. not require a factual basis -for a
valid felony plea. The stated' and- unstated reasons for the failure
to institute such a procedure include problems inherent in
negotiated pleas, time constraints, and judicial attitudes.
During plea negotiations1 the prosecution and' the defense
may strike many types of bargains. 68 The defendant may plead to
162 Id.
163 Id. 38.
3. 4 Cf. id. 38 n.10 (implying that federal courts may accept guilty pleas that
are accompanied by protestations of innocence as long as rule 11s_ factual basis
requirement is met).
165 Id. 38 n.11.
160 See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 111 Ariz. 92, 523 P.2d 789 (1974); Robinson v.
State, 291 A.2d 279 (Del. 1972); People v. Hudson, 7 IMI. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d
533 (1972).
167 In some circumstances plea negotiations are tacit, rather than overt. In
tacit plea bargaining the defendant relies upon the, unstated assumption that the
judge will sentence a defendant who pleads guilty more leniently than he would were
the same defendant convicted at trial. Many judges admit that they consider the
defendant's plea when deciding what sentence to impose, Note, Plea Bargaining:
The Judicial Merry-Go-Round, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 253, 255 (1971), and ans empirical
study conducted by the Yale University Law Journal confirms this practice. Note,
The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66
YALE LJ. 204, 206-209 (1956).
168 A "bargain" exists only When it involves actual or apparent advantages
to both parties. Prosecutors bargain to save the time and expense attendant
on trials; defendants bargain for (1) reduced charges, (2) less severe
sentences, (3) conviction of fewer offenses, or (4) avoidance of the stigma
attaching to conviction of certain classes of crimes, particularly sexual
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the crime as charged,'6 9 to one of several original counts,170 to an
added charge,171 or to a lesser included offense.'72 The establish-
ment of a factual basis can be more difficult, if not impossible, when
the defendant pleads to a crime not encompassed in the original
charge; 173 consequently, some states do not require a factual basis
for negotiated pleas. 74 Other states, however, require a factual
basis even for negotiated pleas.17 The argument for not requiring
a factual basis for negotiated pleas is superficially appealing when
the charge to which the defendant pleads guilty is a hypothetical 17G
or real 177 crime that the defendant did not commit. A truthful
factual basis could not be established for such a plea. The
negotiated plea may have been selected only because of its sentencing
offenses. Although these considerations can be theoretically separated, in
practice they are dependent and interrelated.
F. Mxmrt, Paoscunox 192 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
[T]here are four possible concessions that may be made in a plea
agreement. First, the charge may be reduced to a lesser or related offense.
Second, the attorney for the government may promise to move for dis-
missal of other charges. Third, the attorney for the government may agree
to recommend or not oppose the imposition of a particular sentence.
Fourth, the attorneys for the government and the defense may agree that a
given sentence is an appropriate disposition of the case.
Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. CGrn. P. 11 (1975).
169 Such a plea is colloquially referred to as a plea "on the nose." F. Mirum,
supra note 168, at 193.
170 A defendant might plead to one of the original charges in exchange for
dismissal of one or more other counts. See State v. LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 193
N.W.2d 763 (1972).
171 Added offenses, by definition, have different elements of proof than the
original charge.
1 7 2 Generally, lesser included offenses share some, but not all, elements of the
original offense. See Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included Offenses:
A Herculean Task for the Michigan Courts, 1975 Dar. C.L. 1Ev. 41.
173 Obviously any difference in the elements between the original charge and
the negotiated plea will not disrupt the accuracy inquiry if a defendant has also
committed the lesser included or added offense.
174 See, e.g., People v. Clairborne, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 280 N.E.2d 366, 329
N.Y.S.2d 580 (1972); Wilson v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 508, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973).
175 See, e.g., People v. Spicer, 10 Ill. App. 3d 390, 294 N.E.2d 72 (1973);
People v. Troyan, 21 111. App. 3d 375, 315 N.E.2d 335 (1974). Cf. State v.
Gustafson, 298 Minn. 200, 214 N.A.2d 341 (1974) (factual basis must exist for
crime at least as serious as one to which defendant is willing to plead).
170 A crime may be hypothetical in the sense that it may be theoretically im-
possible for any person to commit such a crime. The use of attempt statutes to
make charge reductions for plea bargaining purposes can create hypothetical crimes
when the specific intent required for the attempt is combined with a crime that
only requires a general intent. See People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 166 N.E.2d
684, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1960) (attempted assault); People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d
150, 225 N.E.2d. 200, 288 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1967) (attempted manslaughter).
177 A real crime is one that is theoretically possible for a person to commit.
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provision,178 without consideration of whether the crime is capable
of being committed or whether the defendant actually committed it.
A factual basis requirement would eliminate these negotiated pleas
that have no basis in fact and thereby assure a defendant of needed
protections. Although the ABA Plea Standards implicitly approve
the procedure whereby a defendant pleads to either a hypothetical
crime or a crime that he did not commit, 179 the innocent pleader
does exist and is entitled to protection. The preferable approach
would be to select carefully a negotiated plea charge for which the
defendant could provide a truthful factual basis and which has a
satisfactory'penalty provision.8 0 Alternatively, the defendant could
be permited to engage in sentence bargaining while pleading to the
original charge."'
Another reason given for eliminating the factual basis for
negotiated pleas is that a defendant pleading guilty to a negotiated
plea is fully cognizant of the facts and believes the evidence against
him to be sufficient to prove his guilt. 82 The Supreme Court
acknowledged the potential fallacy of such an assumption, however,
178 "Certainly the literature on plea negotiations indicates clearly that almost
all defendants in fact bargain for the least sentence possible, and therefore shop for
a category of crime which will leave them subject to the range of punishment which
they believe will benefit them." George,. Lesser Included Offenses in Michigan,
1975 DL-r. C.L. Il-v. 35, 36 (1975). For a discussion of sentence bargaining, see
People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d 777 (1968) (Levin, J., concurring).
Effective sentence bargaining usually requires the'participation of the judge. judicial
participation in plea bargaining, however, is disapproved. See ABA PiE STAND-
ANs, supra note 2, at § 3.3(a). FED. B. Cams. P. 11(e) (1) forbids such judicial
participation.
179 See ABA PLEA, STANDARns, supra note 2, at § 3.1.
180 Revised criminal codes with degree gradations for crimes can facilitate plea
negotiations because they offer greater control over the outside limits of punishment.
George, A Guide to State Criminal Code Revision, in STrtums nq CompAATIvE
CamduA.L LAw 70 (E. Wise & G. Mueller eds. 1975).
181 If judges were required to ascertain a factual basis for all pleas, the reasons
that currently prevent them from engaging in sentence bargaining would not be
compelling. Judicial participation in negotiation as to pleas and sentences is cur-
rently disfavored because of the fear of coercing an innocent defendant to plead
guilty. See note 178 supra. If a factual basis for a plea had to be determined on
the record, however, a factually innocent defendant could not be coerced into
pleading guilty because such a plea could not withstand the scrutiny of an accuracy
inquiry. Notwithstanding the proscription on judicial involvement contained in
federal rule 11(e)(1), this Article favors sentence bargaining in those cases where
afactual basis is required as a means of providing flexibility without coercion in the
negotiation process. Such judicial involvement in plea and sentencing negotiations
is condoned in Michigan, for example. The court may agree to certain pleas or
sentences as long as that bargaining becomes part of the record. Micr. GcEN. CT. R.
785.7(4).
182 See Wilson v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 508, 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973).
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recognizing that a defendant who pleads to one of the original
charges may not understand that his activity was not criminal.ls 3
A defendant who pleads to a negotiated charge cannot be expected
to have any better understanding of the legal process.
Although some courts may believe that the additional time re-
quired to make factual basis inquiries would disrupt trial court
dockets, that assumption is unfounded. The time expenditure need
not be substantial. It has been estimated that a complete voluntari-
ness and accuracy inquiry requires about ten minutes.' s4 In view
of the "cursory question and answer sequence" -s5 often used to
determine voluntariness, this estimate is probably high. In any
event, the accuracy inquiry should require only one to two minutes
at most. The federal courts have easily accommodated the plea
procedures of rule 11, including the factual basis requirement.
There is no reason why other jurisdictions could not have similar
experiences.
Judicial indifference to the possibility of an innocent defendant
offering a guilty plea may be the ultimate reason for the failure to
adopt a factual basis requirement.18 6 Judges may feel either that
even the minimal time expenditure that a factual basis inquiry
would require is not necessary,8 7 or that defendants do not deserve
this additional protection although-as judges know from daily ex-
perience-those defendants may not have received competent assist-
ance of counsel.188
183 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
184 Erickson, Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 Noam DAm L&w. 835, 848
(1973).
185 ABA PLrA STAmAs , supra note 2, at 32.
186 Some judges have expressed "non-judicial" attitudes regarding the people
who appear before them as defendants. See, e.g., Levin, Urban Politics and judicial
Behavior, 1 J. LEGAL SU. 199 (1972) (judges described defendants as "coming
from low intelligence groups," "crummy people," and "congenital criminals"). See
generally ROUGH JusTicE, supra note 33.
187 Many judges, of course, do not have this attitude. "Many judges take the
position ... that the possibility of an innocent person pleading guilty should be
given prime consideration in arraignment proceedings." Newman & NeMoyer, Issues
of Propriety in Negotiated Justice, 47 DEN. L.J. 367, 394 (1970).
188 Although a defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel at
the guilty plea, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), evaluations of the
caliber of counsel are mixed. See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel,
42 U. Cn. L. REv. 1 (1973); Craig, The Right to Adequate Representation in the
Criminal Process: Some Observations, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968); Finer, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRNELL L. REv. 1077 (1973); Kaus & Mallen, The
Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice," 21 U.C.L.A.
L. BEv. 1191 (1974); Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining:
What Is the Standard?, 12 DuQ. L. 1REv. 321 (1973).
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. VI. TaE AccuRAcy. INQUIRY AS CURRENTLY APPLIED
Before advancing a procedure for the accuracy inquiry that
should be followed in all courts, a careful look at the procedures
presently in use in jurisdictions employing an accuracy inquiry is
required. Although federal rule 11 (f) and the various state sources
of the accuracy requirement offer few specific guidelines, an analysis
of the relevant case law reveals three concerns on which to base a
uniform procedure for the accuracy inquiry to be proposed: 1) the
methods used to, determine whether a factual basis exists for the
plea; 2) the standard of proof required for an adequate factual
basis; and, 3) the scope of the inquiry required of a judge in deter-
mining the factual basis.
A. Methods
Three methods of establishing a factual basis for a plea are
accepted in all jurisdictions- inquiry of the defendant, inquiry of
the prosecutor, or examination of the presentence report. The
reaction to other methods has been less than uniform, however.
1. Federal Courts
When the factual basis requirement first became part of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accompanying Advisory
Committee Notes specified that the court could satisfy itself "by
inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government, or by
examining the presentence report, or otherwise, that the conduct
which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the
indictment or information or an offense included therein to which
the defendant has pleaded guilty." 189 The appropriateness and
efficacy of the three specified methods of establishing the accuracy
of a plea have never been seriously questioned in the federal courts.
In fact, they have been implicitly approved by the Supreme
Court.1g0 The trial judge, however, is not restricted to these three
methods of obtaining information to satisfy the factual basis re-
quirement. The use of the word "otherwise" in the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes suggests that other methods may be employed. 191
Consequently, a federal judge is "free to utilize any appropriate
189 Advisory Committee Notes to Fun. R. Cnm. P. 11 (1966).
190 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463 n.6 (1969).
191cf. id. 467 n.20 ('"The nature of the inquiry required by Rule 11 must
necessarily vary from case to case, and, therefore, we do not establish any general
guidelines other than those expressed in the rule itself").
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procedure which seems best for his court and for the kind of case
involved." 192
Because the Supreme Court and rule 11 allow a case-by-case
approach in selecting the method of the accuracy inquiry, a personal
examination of the defendant by the judge, although mandatory
for determination of the voluntariness of the guilty plea,193 is not
required to establish a factual basis. The court may delegate the
duty of questioning an accused to the prosecuting or defense
attorney.194 Virtually any other source may also contribute to the
establishment of a factual basis, including statements of the investi-
gating officer-10 and other witnesses.190  For example, the judge's
personal knowledge of a particular defendant's case after having
previously presided at a trial of that defendant or of his cofelons, 19
and the government's case-in-chief when the guilty plea followed
presentation of the prosecutor's evidence'"9 have served as the
factual basis. In whatever manner the factual basis is determined,
the information establishing the plea's accuracy must be incor-
porated into the record.199
Nevertheless, some controversy remains concerning the use of
particular methods. One method of doubtful validity is the use of
affidavits signed by the defendant.200 The Fifth Circuit has re-
192 ABA PLEA STA ND DS, supra note 2, at 33.
19 3 Fu. R. Cum. P. 11(d).
104 Davis v, United States, 470 F.2d 1128, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) (expressing a
preference, however, for questioning by judge).
105 United States v. Clark, 407 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1969).
1906 See United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973); Gilbert v. United
States, 466 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1972).
19 7 See United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1032 (1975); United States v. Kereluk, Nos. 74-1161-62 (6th Cir. May 10,
1974); X v. United States, 454 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961
(1972). Contra, United States v. Tucker, 425 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1970) (presiding
over trial of codefendant is not sufficient factual basis if judge is aware of defend-
ant's persistent and repeated assertions of innocence).
198 Conley v. United States, 407 F.2d 45 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853
(1969).
199 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Manley v. United
States, 432 F.2d 1241, 1244 (2d Cir. 1970).
200 Perhaps because of the McCarthy requirement of a personal colloquy be-
tween the judge and the defendant to determine the voluntariness of the plea, the
signed affidavit is rarely used in federal courts. Most district court judges merely
continue this personal examination and ask the defendant whether the actions per-
formed conform to the charge in the indictment. The practical effect of rule 11
thus militates against the use of a signed affidavit. Yet a literal reading of the rule
makes clear that the judge is not personally required to address the defendant to
determine whether a factual basis exists.
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quired that "the record must reveal a factual basis for the plea in
addition to representations such as those made in the affidavit." 201
Another controversial method involves the role of the defense
attorney in the accuracy determination. Statements by a defendant's
attorney have been allowed as a contributing source of information
in determining the factual basis,20 2 ..as have statements given by a
defendant to his attorney which have become part of the record.203
The defense attorney, however, must provide the court with more
than a generalized admission that a factual basis does exist.2°4
The single greatest controversy in this area in the federal courts
involves the practice of reading the indictment to the defendant and
then inquiring of him whether he committed the acts in question.
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have ruled that this procedure
does not satisfy the factual basis reqiirement.205 Other circuits,
however, have been more lenient in accepting pleas when the accu-
racy determination was made in this manner.2°6
Although the specific factors to be considered in determining
the appropriateness of this method have not been clearly identified,
some courts have suggested that reading the indictment is not suffi-
cient to establish the factual basis in cases involving more than
one defendant,207 complex questions of fact or law,208 or a defendant
who denies his guilt.209
2. State Courts
Although a few states imposed a factual basis requirement for
guilty pleas before the mid-1960's,21° most did not act until after
accuracy inquiries were mandatory in the federal courts. Because
the states are not bound by the federal rules or the McCarthy de-
cision, however, the methods approved therein were not auto-
201 United States v. White, 483 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1973).
202 See Lovelace v. United States, 439-F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1971).
203 United States v. Rook, 424 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 966 (1970).
204 United States v. Tucker, 425 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1970).
205 United States v. Untiedt, 479 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1973); Maiko v. United
States, 457 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cody, 438 F.2d 287 (8th
Cir. 1971).
206 For example, the Third Circuit in Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409
(3d Cir. 1973) stated that "[tihe adequacy of reading from the indictment will
depend on the facts of the particular case." Id. 415-16 (footnote omitted).
207 United States v. Steele, 413 F.2d 967, 969 (2d Cir. 1969).
2oSjimnez v. United States, 487 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 916 (1974).
209 Dunn v. Casseles, 494 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1974).
210 Note 148 supra.
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matically accepted by the states. Therefore, as states addressed the
factual basis issue, they had to evaluate the appropriateness of
various methods for establishing a factual basis.
The method most frequently used by the states is direct inter-
rogation of a defendant; several state courts have expressed a dis-
tinct preference for this approach.211 Despite the possibility that
the communication process will be distorted to reflect more an
examiner's concerns than a defendant's actual knowledge,212 only
a few courts have discussed the proper form for this colloquy.
Typically, a factual basis is not adequately established by a simple
inquiry as to whether a defendant is pleading guilty or whether he
committed the crime as charged. 213 If the judge includes a terse
layman's description of the offense charged, however, and the
accused acknowledges such conduct, a sufficient factual basis is estab-
lished, according to several jurisdictions. 21 4 Elsewhere this practice
has been disparaged as inadequate. 21 5
Although the accused is typically interrogated by the judge,
some courts allow the defense attorney or the prosecutor to conduct
the questioning.216 The testimony of these attorneys has also been
accepted in some states as a source of the factual basis, provided the
defendant is present.217 A prosecutor's testimony usually consists
211 See, e.g., Kendrick v. State, 308 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
reo'd on other grounds, 336 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1976). Widener v. State, 210 Kan.
234, 499 P.2d 1123 (1972); People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132
(1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977); State v. LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 193
N.W.2d 763 (1972); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 455 Pa. 461, 317 A.2d 228 (1974).
212 See W. BnzGmAM & B. MoOBE, How To INrERviEw (4th rev. ed. 1959);
Burtt & Gaskill, Suggestibility and the Form of the Question, 16 J. ArPL=re PsYcH.
358 (1932); Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 Con Er. L.Q.
391, 402-05 (1933). But see Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp, Effects of Kind of
Question and Atmosphere of Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testi-
mony, 84 HAiy. L. REv. 1620 (1971).
213 E.g., State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 327, 498 P.2d 149 (1972); Ryan v. Iowa
State Penitentiary, 218 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1974); Cote v. State, 286 A.2d 868
(Me. 1972); People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386
(1965).
214 Ray v. Rose, 373 F. Supp. 687 (M.D. Tenn. 1973), re'd on other grounds,
491 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); State v. Campbell,
107 Ariz. 348, 488 P.2d 968 (1971); Widener v. State, 210 Kan. 234, 499 P.2d
1123 (1972).
215 E.g., State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 327, 498 P.2d 149, 151 (1972).
216 E.g., State v. Irving, 299 Minn. 211, 217 N.W.2d 197 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974). Contra, State v. Sisco, 169
N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969).
217 E.g., Church v. State, 299 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1974); People v.
Bowers, 47 Ill. 2d 585, 268 N.E.2d 13 (1971); Morgan v. State, 287 A.2d 592 (Me.
1972); People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 277, 192 N.W.2d 466 (1971); Matthews v.
State, 501 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1973). But cf. State v. LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 193
N.W.2d 763 (1972) (dictum) (reliance upon defense counsel as a method to
determine the accuracy of a guilty plea has been disapproved).
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of a summary of the evidence he expects to present at trial. This
method of establishing a guilty plea's accuracy has been limited
at times, however, by requirements that a prosecutor supply con-
crete facts rather than merely assert that a factual basis exists, 218 and
that the truth of the evidence thus summarized be confirmed by
the defendant. 219
Another source of information as to a guilty plea's factual basis
is the testimony of witnesses before the judge at the plea hearing,220
through formal written statements, 221 or by transcripts from grand
jury222 or prelimnary hearing 223 proceedings. In addition, some
states allow the factual basis to be established by probation 22 4 or
presentence reports,225 charging documents,.22 6 or "any appropriate
procedure." 227 Despite the diversity of methods for the accuracy
inquiry, many states agree that it need not be conducted at the time
of the plea, but may occur any time prior to sentencing.22
B. Standards
Implicit in an accuracy requirement is a minimum standard of
proof necessary for the establishment of an adequate factual basis.
Few jurisdictions, however, have articulated a standard, and even
fewer have interpreted one with any degree of sophistication. Be-
218 See, e.g., Ryan v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 218 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1974).
219 See, e.g., State v. Battelle, 110 Ariz. 436, 520 P.2d 308 (1974); Church v.
State, 299 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
220 See Church v. State, 299 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v.
Quick, 24 Ill. App. 3d 286, 320 N.E.2d 335 (1974); Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d
231, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971).
221 See State v. DeAngelis, 256 S.C. 364, 182 S.E.2d 732 (1971).
222 See State v. Dixon, 111 Ariz. 92, 523 P.2d 789 (1974); Young v. Brewer,
190 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1971).
223 See State v. Durham, 108 Ariz. 327, 498 P.2d 149 (1972); People v. Chilton,
394 Mich. 34, 228 N.W.2d (1975); Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 213 N.W.2d
31 (1973) (preliminary hearing transcript and other records sufficient only if parties
so stipulate).
224 See State v. Miller, 15 Ariz. App. 327, 488 P.2d 683 (1971); People v.
Canino, 181 Colo. 207, 508 P.2d 1273 (1973).
225 See State v. Wilhiker, 107 Ariz. 611, 491 P.2d 465 (1971); People v.
Alvare2; 181 Colo. 213, 508 P.2d 1267 (1973); People v. Price, 9 I1. App. 3d 693,
292 N.E.2d 752 (1973); State v. LeGear, 187 Neb. 763, 193 N.W.2d 763 (1972)
(dictum).
226 See State v. Anderson, 270 Minn. 411, 134 N.W.2d 12 (1965); People v.
LaPorte, 342 N.Y.S.2d 739, 41 App. Div. 2d (1973).
227 See People v. Price, 9 Ill. App. 3d 693, 292 N.E.2d 752 (1973); Cote v.
State, 286 A.2d 868 (Me. 1972); State v. Armstrong, 263 S.C. 594, 211 S.E.2d 889
(1975).
228 See State v. Williker, 107 Ariz. 611, 491 P.2d 465 (1971); Mower v. State,
308 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); People v. Warship, 59 111. 2d 125, 319
N.E.2d 507 (1974); State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143 (Iowa 1975); Morgan v. State,
287 A.2d 592 (Me. 1972).
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cause neither the Supreme Court,229 federal rule 11,230 nor the ABA
Plea Standards 231 offer any real guidance on the standard of proof
required, lower federal and state courts have been left to formulate
their own standards.
1. Federal Courts
A federal court standard of proof for factual basis is virtually
nonexistent. The subjectivity inherent in rule 11, which merely
states that a court must satisfy itself that a factual basis exists, 23 2
and the deference given to a trial court's discretion in accepting or
rejecting pleas have resulted in an "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" ap-
proach to the adequacy of the plea's factual basis. This subjective
test led one observer to comment that
[t]here should be no room, under the final version of
the rule, for collateral attack by a prisoner who contends
that in fact there was no factual basis for his plea, unless
uncontradicted facts disclosed by the record unequivocally
demonstrate that the acts committed do not constitute the
offense charged in the indictment or information. 233
Linked to this subjective test is a district court's wide dis-
cretion whether to accept or reject guilty pleas. Although a judge
cannot accept a guilty plea lacking any factual basis, rule 11 gives
a court the discretion to reject a tendered guilty plea even if a
factual basis does exist.234 A court's substantial leeway in this re-
gard was described by the Eighth Circuit as "the greatest discretion
because of the need for assurance that a guilty plea proceeding be
completely safeguarded to protect the unknowing defendant." 23 5
22 9 Neither Alford nor McCarthy offer any direct guidance on the issue of the
standard of proof; Alford does refer, however, to the ambiguous standard of a
"strong" factual basis. 400 U.S. at 38.
2 30 The Advisory Committee Notes speak only to methods, not standards. See
62 F.R.D. 271, 286 (1974).
231 The A.B.A. left the standard to the discretion of the judge. ABA PLFA
STANDms, supra note 2, at 33.
232 See note 5 supra.
233 1 C. Wnrcr-r, FEDmuL PRAcncEr AsN PNocEnuaE § 174 (1969) (footnotes
omitted).
234 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962) (no absolute right to have
plea accepted); United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974).
235 United States v. Bettelyoun, 503 F.2d 1333, 1337 (8th Cir. 1974).
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The courts of appeals regularly defer to a trial judge's exercise of
discretion unless it is clearly erroneous.2 6 As a result of such sub-
jectivity, discretion, and deference, a defendant challenging the dis-
position of his guilty plea is relegated to focusing on the methods
employed by the trial court rather than upon the sufficiency of
the evidence.237
For analytical purposes, guilty pleas can be separated into
equivocal and unequivocal pleas. Unequivocal pleas are those in
which a defendant admits his involvement in the crime and ex-
presses that, to the extent of his knowledge, he is guilty. Equivocal
pleas are more troubling. Although the defendant is pleading
guilty, what is said (or perhaps what is not said) during the plea
procedure implies that the defendant may be legally innocent.2 38
When a trial judge is confronted with an unequivocal plea, his dis-
cretion is virtually unquestionable.239 As long as the judge employs
a proper method to establish the factual basis, the only remaining
question is whether the judge is subjectively satisfied that a factual
basis exists. The equivocal guilty plea, on the other hand, has been
a subject of controversy and a frequent basis for collateral attack.
Cases involving equivocal guilty pleas arise in two distinct contexts.
In one a defendant whose plea was accepted argues on appeal that
it should have been rejected. In the other, the plea was rejected
because it lacked a factual basis, and the defendant argues on appeal
that it should have been accepted. Because rule 11 only requires
that a court must be satisfied that a factual basis exists before accept-
ing a guilty plea, the rejection of an equivocal plea falls in the vast
area of district court discretion that is virtually unreviewable.
236 See United States v. Komitor, 392 F.2d 520, 521 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 827 (1968); United States v. Giuliano, 348 F.2d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Hughes, 325 F.2d 789, 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 907(1964).
237 The difficulty in separating the methods used to determine factual basis
from the standard of proof is illustrated by this quotation from United States v.
Cody, 438 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1971): "The government's argument that this was
flfilled by the prosecutor reading from the indictment in the presence of the
defendant falls far short of demonstrating any factual basis for the defendant's plea."
Id. 289. The court decides that a minimum standard of proof had not been met,
but the route to that determination depends upon the inadequacy of the methods
used. Because the standard of proof for unequivocal pleas is usually subjective, the
sufficiency of the evidence turns on the methods used rather than on the evidentiary
standards.
238 See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
239 In only one federal case has the discretion of a trial court been overturned
on appeal when the plea was unequivocal. See United States v. Ammidown, 49T
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The abuse of discretion in Ammidown was unrelated
to the standard of proof required.
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In North Carolina v. Alford, 40 the Supreme Court found no
constitutional barriers to the acceptance of equivocal pleas if the
factual basis was "strong" and the defendant voluntarily and in-
telligently chose to plead. The Alford opinion is, however, very
limited in its effect on the federal court system, although the ap-
proach of several circuits toward equivocal pleas has been somewhat
altered.241 Because the rejection of the guilty plea is strictly a dis-
cretionary matter, Alford has little impact when trial judges do not
wish to accept an equivocal plea, regardless of the strength of the
evidence against the defendant. Even the Supreme Court has added
its imprimatur to the proposition that a criminal defendant has no
absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted.2 42
Although some courts consider the rejection of equivocal pleas
purely discretionary,243 others approach equivocal pleas by focusing
on the voluntariness of the plea and attaching greater importance
to the wishes of the defendant. 244 Still others suggest that the re-
jection of such pleas constitutes an abuse of discretion if there is
ample evidence of guilt.245 Between these extremes lie the Alford
opinion, which removes the constitutional barriers from acceptance
of such pleas without compelling their acceptance, and the "public
interest" approach, under which the judge's decision to accept or
reject a plea turns on policy considerations. 46
240 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
241 Prior to Alford, the Third Circuit indicated that the acceptance of an
equivocal guilty plea might constitute a denial of due process. United States ex rel.
Metz v. Maroney, 404 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 949 (1969).
Following Alford, however, the Third Circuit held in United States v. Jerry, 487
F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973), that equivocal guilty pleas supported by a strong factual
basis in the record could be accepted.
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Hulsey v. United States, 369 F.2d 284, 287
(5th Cir. 1966), required an "unqualified admission of the offense charged" before
a guilty plea could be accepted. Although this inflexible rule against accepting any
equivocal plea was modified after Alford, the Fifth Circuit remains dissatisfied with
the acceptance of equivocal pleas. See United States v. Davis, 493 F.2d 502 (5th
Cir. 1974).
242 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962).
243 See United States v. Melendrez-Salas, 466 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1972).
244 See United States v. Martinez, 486 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejection of
equivocal guilty plea only with good reason); United States v. Bednarshi, 445 F.2d
364 (1st Cir. 1971) (court must seriously consider acceptance of tendered plea);
McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (equivocal guilty plea
should not be rejected without good reason).
245 Only one court has adopted this absolute standard. In United States v.
Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the D.C. Circuit stated: "It is an abuse
of discretion to refuse a guilty plea solely because the defendant does not admit the
alleged facts of the crime." Id. 1048.
246 See United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 62 F.R.D. 271, 286 (1974).
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When federal courts do accept equivocal guilty pleas, they have
not construed Alford's vague requirement of a "stiong" factual
basis to require proof of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Several circuits have stated this conclusion explicitly,247
whereas others have implicitly ruled that less than a trial standard
for conviction will suffice.2 8 The District of Columbia Circuit,
for example, articulated the standard as "a high probability of con-
viction." -249 This approach reflects a significant change of focus.
Rather than being satisfied with a discretionary standard for accept-
ing the plea, this approach looks beyond the plea bargaining process
to project the probability of guilt if the defendant were to stand trial.
The application of this test has generated some confusion, though.2 50
2. State Courts
Although several of the states with factual basis requirements
have set standards of proof for both equivocal and unequivocal
pleas, the paucity of guidance on this issue has resulted in a lack of
uniformity. The standards for unequivocal pleas vary widely from
each other and from the standard for conviction at trial. These
standards include 1) guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; 251 2) might
have been convicted at trial; 252 3) a basis for reasonably concluding
that the defendant actually committed the crime; 253 and 4) not
unreasonable to conclude guilt. 254
A standard of proof which is less than that required to support
conviction at trial and which is not normally used in the criminal
justice system is difficult to articulate.2 55 Consequently, some juris-
247 See, e.g., Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971);
McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
248 See, e.g., United States ex rel Dunn v. Casscles, 494 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1974); Maxwell v. United States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966).
-
249 Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 120 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
250The First Circuit in United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958 (1971), held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
not required, but then seemed to contradict itself: "It should be enough if there is
sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that he is guilty." Id. 403.
251 See Ar.. CoDE tit. 15,- § 264 (1958). This high standard may be partially
explained by the fact that, except in capital cases, Alabama does not permit appellate
review of plea convictions.
2.52 See People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977).
253 See People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (1972) (standard
is less than that required to convict and even less than a preponderance of the
evidence); Morgan v. State, 287 A.2d 592 (Me. 1972).
254 See Clewey v. State, 288 A.2d 468 (Me. 1972).
255 People v. Nyberg, 24 Ill. App. 3d 41, 48, 320 N.E.2d 546, 551 (1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 64 Ill. 2d 210, 356 N.E.2d 80 (1976).
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dictions have refrained from fixing a single standard of proof, opting
instead for a case-by-case approach. The standard may vary, for
example, depending upon the defendant's demeanor,25 6 personal
history,257 or the complexity of the charge.258  Unlike the federal
courts, the states have not set special standards of proof for equivocal
pleas and instead apply the Alford requirement of a "strong" factual
basis to each case individually.
A corollary of the question of the standard of proof is the extent
to which proof of the factual basis must appear on the record.
Although some courts suggest that the better practice is for a trial,
judge to recite on the record those facts relied upon in finding a
factual basis, 259 not all courts require this procedure. The accuracy
requirement has been satisfied when the judge merely states on the
record his belief that a factual basis does exist,2 60 or when the record
itself reflects sufficient basis for the plea.261
C. Scope
The scope of the accuracy inquiry defines the degree to which a
judge must probe a plea beyond an ostensibly adequate factual basis.
Even if a prima facie factual basis exists, further inquiry may be
necessary because the plea is equivocal or because the evidence pre-
sented may be inadmissible or otherwise suggest a possible legal
defense.
1. Federal Courts
The scope of the accuracy determination has received little at-
tention in the federal courts. Because any broadening of the in-
quiry's scope could be costly and time consuming,26 2 trial courts have
been extremely reluctant to expand the factual basis procedure,
256 See State v. Campbell, 107 Ariz. 348, 488 P.2d 968 (1971).
2 57 See Hall v. State, 309 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
258 See Cerniglia v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
259 See Mower v. State, 308 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); People v.
Price, 9 IM. App. 3d 693, 292 N.E.2d 752 (1973).
2 60 See People v. Doe, 6 MII. App. 3d 799, 286 N.E.2d 645 (1972).
261 See Mower v. State, 308 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Morgan v.
State, 287 A.2d 592 (Me. 1972).
262 An increased scope of the inquiry might, however, reduce the number of
appeals because the issue of the scope of the factual basis would have been resolved
on the record in the trial court.
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fearing that it might become a time-consuming, full-blown evi-
dentiary hearing.263
The extent of the scope required varies from case to case. A
problem arises as to the elements of the crime that must be demon-
strated. One commentator interprets rule i i to require 'a com-
parison of the elements of the crime, to which the plea is offered,
with the facts of the offense committed by the defendant." 24 Some
courts interpret the accuracy inquiry to require proof only of ob-
vious issues.265 Other circuits reject this rule,2 66 however, perhaps
out of reluctance to require judges to inquire into matters that
may only appear "obvious" in retrospect.267 Convictions based on
guilty pleas have been reversed, however, because "essential" ele-
ments were not established during the factual basis inquiry,26  par-
ticularly the element of intent.269
Another problem that has received scant attention in the fed-
eral courts is the necessity for further inquiry when a potential legal
defense is indicated. In general, contradictions in the evidence and
suggestions of a possible defense have not constituted barriers to the
263 See United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1970).
264 8 Moonis FEDERAL PRAcncE 7 11.0331, at 1172 (2d ed. 1977) (footnote
omitted).
265 See Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1975) (for obscenity
conviction, must determine whether material was constitutionally protected); United
States v. Untiedt, 479 F.2d 1265 (8th Cir. 1973) (must show that goods stolen
were part of interstate shipment); Gilbert v. United States, 466 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.
1972) (no factual basis for seven counts because only one illegal transportation was
shown).
266 See Limon-Gonzalez v. United States, 499 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1974) (even
though having an order form for marijuana would have been a defense to the charge
of possession without paying transfer tax, judge need not determine whether defend-
ant had such a form); United States v. Singletary, 441 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1971)
(crime involved stealing money order over $100, but court did not require deter-
mination of the dollar amount stolen); Semet v. United States, 422 F.2d 1269 (10th
Cir. 1970) (for charge of placing a person's life in jeopardy, the court did not have
to consider whether the gun involved was capable of inflicting bodily harm).
267 See Semet v. United States, 422 F.2d 1269 (10th Cir. 1970). "It taxes the
imagination to conceive of a judge or lawyer who could divine every conceivable
defense, mitigating circumstance, or corollary element to disclose to an accused in
satisfying himself that the plea was voluntary and there was a factual basis for the
plea." Id. 1272.
268 See, e.g., Rizzo v. United States, 516 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1975) (plea re-
versed because the court failed to inquire into the element of actual or threatened
force or violence which is essential to the charge of extortion).
269 See United States v. Hedgecoe, 420 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Steele, 413 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1969), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1970).
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acceptance of a guilty plea,270 notwithstanding criticism and de-
cisions to the contrary.27'1
Federal practice does not indicate the extent to which the judge
should extend the scope of the accuracy inquiry to prior violations
of the defendant's constitutional rights. The Eighth Circuit, how-
ever, perceived the value of such further inquiry:
[A] large number of arraignments covering a variety of
crimes, may lead to an inadvertent oversight of an essential
element of a particular crime. Government counsel will
be more familiar with the charge and the circumstances in-
dicating defendant's guilt. Controversy may have devel-
oped prior to entry of the plea over a confession, seizure of
evidence, defendant's health and use of drugs, and many
other factors which might affect defendant's plea. In short,
supplemental inquiry can be very helpful to the Court in
discharging its duties.2 72
Most opinions confronting this issue, however, have focused on
voluntariness.2 73 The role of the accuracy determination in protect-
ing an accused's constitutional rights remains unclear.
2. State Courts
The scope of the factual basis inquiry has received greater at-
tention in state courts than in federal courts. Questions regarding
the scope of the factual basis inquiry have generally arisen in cases
where the facts conflict, infer a defense, or are based on evidence
that would be considered inadmissible at trial.
One consideration is whether the judge must make a further
inquiry when the defendant presents information to the court for
factual basis purposes that conflicts with other facts before the court
or with the factual basis necessary for the crime charged. Conflict-
ing fact patterns can obviously arise when multiple methods of de-
270 United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 958 (1971) (factual basis existed though defendant claimed that his implicative
statement to court contradicted previous protestations that he did not know car was
stolen); Griffin v. United States, 405 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (must accept
guilty plea despite inconsistent statements of accused and indications of possible
self-defense claim).
271 See United States v. Ray, 431 F.2d 1177 (9th Cir. 1970) (plea rejected
because defendant told probation officer that he believed he was innocent); Maxwell
v. United States, 368 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1966) (plea of defendant who had been
intoxicated and therefore could not recall crime refused).
272 United States v. Rawlins, 440 F.2d 1043, 1047 n.5 (8th Cir. 1971).
273 See, e.g., Doran v. Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1966).
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reimining the factual basis are employed,2 74 but may even arise when
only one method is used.275 Appellate courts generally resolve these
conflicts by-affirming convictions without mentioning the scope of
inquiry, but at least one state requires a greater scope in such cir-
cumstances.
2 76
The scope issue arises more frequently when the defendant
claims an inability to remember his actions or when facts that be-
come known to the judge at the plea or sentence stage indicate that
certain defenses may be available. Occasionally when pleas are
offered a defendant claims he cannot remember committing the
offense.277 Although this "failure to remember" should alert the
judge to possible related defenses, such as incompetence to enter a
plea,278 insanity,2 79 or intoxication,280 no state requires the judge to
274 E.g., Kendrick v. State, 308 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd,
336 So. 2d 353 (1976) (defendant and witnesses presented conflicting information).
275 E.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 450 Pa. 548, 301 A.2d 359 (1973) (at
sentence, 35 days after the court accepted plea based on the defendant's statement,
the defendant offered a different explanation which indicated his innocence).
2 7 6 See People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386
(1965); People v. Johnson, 33 App. Div. 2d 573, 305 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1969).
277 An interesting comment has been made regarding the truth of assertions by
defendants that they do not remember.
[The] assumption is that the innocent are more likely than the guilty to
equivocate in pleading. But what reason is there to believe that this
assumption is valid? It has been noted that emotional disturbance, which
may lead to an inaccurate plea, is difficult to detect in the short space of an
arraignment. And it is difficult to imagine why an emotionally disturbed
person would be likely to reveal his problem by hedging his plea.
A fortiori, a truly innocent, rational man who, for his own reasons, chooses
to "take the rap" is least likely of all to tergiversate when pleading. Finally,
there is no evidence that those guilty of only a lesser crime are more likely
to equivocate. Indeed, it may well be that chief among the equivocators
are the merely reluctant guilty and the dissemblers. Consequently, the
asserted nexus between equivocation and inaccuracy of plea (innocence of
crime charged) would appear to be problematic at best.
Note, Equivocal Guilty Pleas-Should They Be Accepted?, 75 DscK. L. REv. 366,
374-75 (1971).
True inability to remember facts of the offense might be the result of psycho-
logical blocks, mental instability, or an altered state of consciousness at the time of
the act. See Young v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1971) (claimed inability to
recall because of intoxication and brain damage); State v. Fisher, 292 Minn. 453,
193 N.W.2d 819 (1972) (amnesia); Meeks v. State, 484 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1972)
(amnesia and mental defect); People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 310 N.E.2d
292, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1974) (amnesia and intoxication).
278 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); State v. Vane, 322 A.2d 58
(Me. 1974). See generally Note, Competence to Plead Guilty: A New Standard,
1974 D=KE L.J. 149.
2 7 9 See A. Gor'srmaN, THE INsAmrY DEFENSE (1967).
2 8 0 Voluntary or involuntary intoxication is a defense to crime when it negates
the existence of an element of the crime. See Hall, Intoxication and Criminal
Responsibility, 57 HAv. L. REv. 1045 (1944); Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense
to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
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increase the scope .of the factual basis inquiry merely because the
defendant cannot recall having committed the crime.
A different result has been reached in a closely related area
when, during the accuracy inquiry, reference is explicitly made to
such possible defenses as self-defense, 281 intoxication,28 2 or lack of
criminal intent.2s3 The discovery of such a defense is consistent
with the rationale of requiring a factual basis to protect the defend-
ant from pleading guilty when, in fact, he is not. A number of
cases have been reversed because the trial judge did not inquire
further when the offered plea included evidence of a possible de-
fense. 284
Even in the absence of a factual conflict or an apparent defense,
the type of evidence used to establish the factual basis may be ex-
panded. Use of statements of counsel, the presentence report, or
the preliminary examination transcript in jurisdictions that allow
hearsay testimony at this proceeding frequently involve testimony
that would be inadmissible at trial. Two jurisdictions have indi-
cated a concern about the use of such evidence. One court reversed
a plea in a murder case because hearsay was used to establish the
elements of the crime.2s5 Another permitted only admissible evi-
dence to be used at a postconviction proceeding to evaluate the vol-
untariness determination.28 6
Like the federal courts, the state courts rarely elaborate those
elements of the crime that must be established in the factual basis.
Only a few require that the record include evidence of each element
in order to establish a plea's accuracy. 28 7 Even if only "essential" 28S
elements must be established, the question remains whether infer-
ences may be used to do so. 2 9 State courts are generally willing to
281 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 269 A.2d 709 (1970).
282*See, e.g., State v. Battelle, 110 Ariz. 436, 520 P.2d 308 (1974); People v.
Troyan, 21 II. App. 3d 375, 315 N.E.2d 335 (1974); Young v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d
434 (Iowa 1971).
283 Criminal intent may be lacking altogether or intoxication may have the
effect of negating any possible specific intent. See People v. Troyan, 21 111. App. 3d
375, 315 N.E.2d 335 (1974).
284 See, e.g., id.; Wayne v. State, 4 Md. App. 424, 243 A.2d 19 (1968);
People v. Stoner, 23 Mich. App. 598, 179 N.W.2d 217 (1970).
285 See People v. Nyberg, 24 Ill. App. 3d 41, 320 N.E.2d 546 (1974).
286 See Morgan v. State, 287 A.2d 592, 598 (Me. 1972).
287 See, e.g., State v. Herndon, 109 Ariz. 147, 506 P.2d 1041 (1973).
288 See People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (1972) (factual
basis must include evidence of intent if it is necessary element of the crime).
289 Courts may have to rely on inferences even when the accuracy inquiry
involves direct interrogation of the accused if he does not answer the questions
directly or is unable to respond because of loss of memory or intoxication at the
time of the crime.
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draw such inferences, 290 especially in establishing the element of
intent.291
VII. A PROPOSED STANDARD FOR THE AccuRAcY INQUIRY
The preceding discussion demonstrates the value of an accuracy
inquiry in protecting an innocent defendant, the limited areas in
which the criminal justice system now provides that protection, and
the absence of standards and lack of uniformity where the pro-
tection is enforced. The following standard for accuracy inquiries
intends to rectify these lacunae in the pleading process.292
A. Proposal
I. The accuracy of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere must be
established on the record
A) by the most reliable method available. Unless determined
otherwise by the judge on the record, the order of re-
liability is:
1) personal interrogation of the defendant
2) testimony of witnesses
3) statements of counsel, and
4) presentence or probation reports.
B) under a standard of proof equivalent to the proof necessary
to defeat a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal for
the crime to which the defendant pleads.
II. Despite an indication that the plea does not meet the factual
basis standard, a judge may still accept a plea if, after he informs
the defendant of the apparent deficiency in the factual basis, the
judge establishes on the record that the defendant rationally chose
to plead and concludes on the record that there is a probability of
conviction at trial.
290See People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977) ("A factual basis for acceptance of a plea exists if
an inculpatory inference can reasonably be drawn by a jury from the facts admitted
by the defendant even if an exculpatory inference could also be drawn and defendant
asserts the latter is the correct inference." Id. at 130, 235 N.W.2d at 145).
291 See Thacker v. State, 313 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); People
v. Warship, 59 II1. 2d 125, 319 N.E.2d 507 (1974); Clewley v. State, 288 A.2d 468
(Me. 1972); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974).
292 The accuracy inquiry will be only one part of the full plea colloquy. A
voluntariness inquiry is also required. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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B. Commentary
The accuracy inquiry should apply to both guilty pleas and to
pleas of nolo contendere293 Although the nolo contendere plea, by
definition,294 precludes the establishment of a factual basis by per-
sonal interrogation of the defendant, there is no justification for
entirely eliminating the accuracy protections for defendants who
choose to use this plea.295 Although there may be clear advantages
for defendants who plead nolo contendere,2" they deserve the same
factual basis protection as those who plead guilty.
The accuracy determination must be made by an inquiry on
the record.297 This requirement assures that the trial judge must
actually evaluate the factual basis, and that the record will provide
293The nolo contendere plea allows a court to impose a prison sentence on a
defendant who does not admit his guilt. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451
(1926). The reasons why a defendant might wish to enter a plea of nolo contendere
include:
(1) a reluctance on defendant's part to relate the details of a particularly
sordid crime (e.g., sexual assault on a child); (2) the defendant's recollec-
tion of the facts may be unclear because he was intoxicated . . . or he
committed so many crimes of a like nature that he cannot differentiate one
from another; and (3) because he wishes to minimize other repercussions
(e.g., civil litigation).
People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 134, 235 N.W.2d 132, 147 (1975) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977).
294 Generally speaking, the plea of nolo contendere is an implied confession
which admits the facts charged in the indictment and thus is similar to a
plea of guilty. However, the nolo plea admits the facts for the sole purpose
of the criminal prosecution. Therefore, unlike a guilty plea, it cannot be
used as an admission in a subsequent civil suit.
Comment, The Plea of Nolo Contendere, 25 MN. L. REv. 227, 227 (1965). See
generally Lenvin & Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YALE
L.J. 1255 (1942).
295 But cf. People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977). Michigan requires that before accepting a plea of
nolo contendere, the judge must first state on the record reasons for believing that
the interests of the defendant and the proper administration of justice do not require
interrogation of the defendant regarding his participation in the crime.
Under the proposed standard, a judge could then examine any witnesses and
counsel, or the presentence or probation reports.
2996The principal advantage to a defendant is that the plea of nolo contendere
cannot be used against him as an admission of guilt in a civil action based on the
same acts. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926); FED. B. Cn m. P.
11(e) (6); Note, Use of the Nol Contendere Plea in Subsequent Contexts, 44 S. CAL.
L. RBv. 737 (1971). This has made the plea very popular with anti-trust defend-
ants. See 1 C. WnICrT, FEDEmAL RACTICE AD PROCEDURE § 177, at 389 (1969).
In addition, the plea is said to avoid the stigma of a guilty plea. United States v.
American Bakeries Co., 284 F. Supp. 864, 868 (W.D. Mich. 1968); United States
v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
297 Requiring an inquiry on the record conforms to present federal law. FED.
R. CBm. P. 11(g) requires a court to make a verbatim record of "the inquiry into
the accuracy of a guilty plea."
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a basis for appellate review.2 98 The availability of appellate review
may be as important as the trial judge's factual basis determination
itself, particularly when the judge is not a lawyer or when the
defendant is not represented by counsel.'
A lay judge should not be excused from determining a factual
basis for a plea merely because of his minimal legal qualifications.
Due to the repetitive caseload in most lower courts, even lay judges,
with the combination of experience and the assistance of prosecutors,
should be able to determine if a factual basis is present. A require-
ment that the judge attempt to establish a factual basis would at
least afford the defendant the protection of the record so that an
appellate court could later review his. conviction.
There is no indication that trial :courts presently employ any
criteria other than convenience in determining what method to use
for establishing the factual basis of a particular plea. Courts seem
to assume that a defendant can easily comprehend both the law
and the facts and that all methods for establishing the factual basis
are equally reliable. These assumptions ignore the Supreme Court's
concern expressed in McCarthy v. United States that the plea
bargaining process must be separated from judicial assumptions and
must be based on the responses of the parties involved. 99 Ignorance
of the nuances of the law is hardly rare.300 Not surprisingly, a de-
fendant often lacks the legal expertise to determine whether his
298 If the accuracy inquiry were only required to be made in open court, but
not be recorded, appellate courts could not evaluate the adequacy of the factual
basis. No check on the abuse of the trial judge's discretion would be available.
An incomplete record leaves doubt as to the reliability of the plea procedure which
was followed. Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1634 (1977) (Pqwell, J.,
concurring). Insulation from appellate review may encourage-or at least. will not
inhibit-procedural error and abuse of discretion. See S. BiNG & S. RosEmNxLD,
supra note 108, at 26-27; S. Kp &rz, supra note 111, at 186.
299 To the extent that the district judge thus exposes the defendant's state
of mind on the record through personal interrogation, he not only facilitates
his own determination of a guilty pleas voluntariness, but he also facilitates
that determination in any subsequent post-conviction proceeding based upon
a claim that the plea was involuntary. Both of these goals are undermined
in proportion to the degree the district judge resorts to "assumptions" not
based upon recorded responses to his inquiries.
394 U.S. at 467.
300 As one court has stated with some degree of understatement:
It is not unlikely that a large number of defendants are unaware of the
exculpatory nuances of the law under which they believe they have com-
mitted a crime. This is especially true where individual elements of the
crime are each independent pre-conditions to conviction and each necessary
of proof, or where the acts themselves are measured in fine degree when
assessing whether a crime has taken place.
Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1975).
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actions constitute the crime in question.301 Although some methods
are more likely to illumine the true nature of a defendant's activity,
others are more likely to distort it.302 Although neither McCarthy
nor the notes to the federal rules express a preference among the
approved methods, courts should recognize that a hierarchy of re-
liability exists among methods and should employ the most reliable
method available in order to accomplish the goals of the inquiry.
Less reliable methods should be employed only if more reliable
methods have proven inadequate. 03
The best method of determining the factual basis is by the
direct interrogation of the defendant. Even though some lower courts
have found alternatives to personal interrogation for the voluntari-
ness inquiry, that method can best accomplish the purposes of the
accuracy inquiry. These purposes cannot be accomplished by the
use of printed forms, which are fraught with difficulties that would
make the inquiry less accurate, more time consuming, and would
not even accomplish the desired saving of courtroom time.3 04 This
method not only allows the judge to hear the most complete and
accurate description of the defendant's acts and intent, but it also
assists him in determining the voluntariness of the plea. The
defendant, who is usually present at the plea,305 may be questioned
further if the initial statement is incomplete or raises additional
problems.
In determining the factual basis, the court should first have the
defendant recite the facts as he knows them; only afterward should
301 The defendant cannot be expected to be a lawyer. He is but one of the
actors in the plea bargaining scenario. Each of the principal characters in the plea
bargaining process has a specific courtroom role. The defendant brings his knowl-
edge of the facts as they occurred; the prosecutor possesses the government's view
of the facts; the judge is required to apply his unique knowledge of the law to the
facts in question.
302 Distortion can result from the need to draw inferences regarding specific
intent and knowledge if the defendant is not the source of the factual basis, from
the use of hearsay, or from the use of sources having both an interest in the outcome
and the knowledge to tailor the facts to make the plea acceptable.
303 See, e.g., People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 134 n.3, 235 N.W.2d 132, 147
n.3, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977) ("Direct questioning is not an absolute.
• . . [V]here the judge makes a conscientious effort to establish a factual basis
for a plea of guilty by direct questioning of the defendant, omissions in the record
recital of the factual basis may be established in some other manner." Id.).3 0 See note 26 supra.
305 Some jurisdictions require that the defendant always enter his plea in person.
See, e.g., Oxr.. STAT. Am. tit. 22, § 516 (West 1969). Others allow a misde-
meanor plea to be entered by counsel and do not require that the defendant be
present. See, e.g., CAL. PENLr. CoDE § 1429 (West 1970); KAN. STAT. AmN.
§ 22-3210(6) (Supp. 1974). The federal rules permit the defendant to be absent in
certain circumstances. See FED. R. Caim. P. 43(c). Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337 (1970) (It is constitutionally permissible, under certain circumstances, to waive
one's right to be present at trial).
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the court proceed with further inquiries. This method best ac-
complishes the intended purpose of the accuracy inquiry.8 6 The
defendant has an opportunity to give his version of the facts and
the judge gains insight into such factors as specific intent and
possible defenses. A presentation by the defendant is likely to
suggest questions to the judge which could serve as the starting
point for an ensuing colloquy.
The use of testimony from witnesses who would testify at trial
is nearly as accurate a procedure for establishing the factual basis
as questioning the defendant. The major difference is the necessity
of establishing by inference any intent or knowledge required for
the offense. Although possibly more time consuming8O7 and in-
convenient than other methods,80 this method is characterized by a
high degree of reliability.30 9 The judge can question the witnesses
under oath, separate personal knowledge from hearsay, and inquire
into facts related to specific defenses. The use of prior recorded
statements of witnesses, such as a preliminary examination, evi-
dentiary hearing, or a grand jury transcript, could also be used to
establish a factual basis, despite their attendant disadvantages.81 0
Statements by counsel or presentence reports should be used only if
both of the first two methods are unavailable or have failed to pro-
vide an adequate factual basis. Either the prosecutor or defense
counsel may nonetheless be a convenient source of the factual basis.
They are both usually present in court; 811 they may have personally
investigated the case before entering into plea negotiations; they
are knowledgeable about the law. The prosecutor frequently has a
8 0 6 The accuracy inquiry is much like an interview. It is generally accepted
that if the interviewee is initially allowed to tell his story without interruption, the
interviewer learns what the interviewee thinks is important about the incident.
A. AMsTERDAm , B. SEGAL & M. MuLER, TRtAL MANUAL Fon au DEFENSE OF
CnmiNAL CASES § 83 (1975).
307 Several witnesses may be required to establish all the elements of the charge.
308 The witnesses may have to make a special court appearance to offer support
for the factual basis. If a study were done, it might be found that this method is
employed only when the defendant pleads on the day scheduled for trial, and the
witnesses have been summoned to court in anticipation of their having to testify at
trial.
809 Besides reliability, this method can provide tangential advantages by eliciting
information that might be useful for sentencing purposes, such as the severity of the
injuries resulting from the assault.
310 Even though the factual basis would still come from a witness with first-
hand knowledge, the judge could not make additional inquiries into questionable
areas.
311 Defense counsel may not always be present, however, either because the
defendant chose to represent himself, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975),
or because the judge chose not to appoint a defense counsel in a case in which it
was not required. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
[Vol. 126:88
GUILTY PLEAS
written report which was the basis of the original charge and can
simply be read into the record to establish a factual basis.3 12
Counsel frequently can summarize the anticipated testimony of
several witnesses, thereby speeding the determination of a factual
basis when numerous witnesses would otherwise be necessary.
Despite the potential time savings provided by the use of these
attorneys, considerable disadvantages also ensue. If both have agreed
that a plea is the desirable solution, they may employ their legal
expertise to select for presentation only those facts that will tend to
establish the factual basis, purposely neglecting those facts which
would undermine the validity of the plea. Unscrupulous defense
attorneys might persuade their clients to plead guilty when the case
does not warrant such a plea. Furthermore, even though the de-
fendant could waive the lawyer-client privilege and allow the lawyer
to establish the factual basis, some might consider it unseemly that
the defense attorney should supply the only evidence resulting in
his client's conviction, particularly if the state's case is based on
evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, such as a coerced con-
fession. If, on the other hand, there are witnesses who are available
for trial, but not for the plea, the prosecutor, not the defense attor-
ney, should summarize their testimony. Defendants pitted against
the power of the state, especially those with court-appointed attor-
neys, should not have their tenuous faith in the legal system further
jeopardized by hearing the only evidence leading to their convic-
tions coming from the mouths of their state-appointed lawyers.3 13
The principal disadvantage in the use of counsel's statements
or presentence reports is that the sources of the factual basis will not
have any personal knowledge of the alleged crime. In addition to
the untrustworthiness of hearsay, the use of presentence reports
presents an additional complication because they are not intended
to prove the alleged crime in a court of law but rather to determine
the proper sentence for a defendant. They are prepared by persons
without legal training who may justifiably-but perhaps inaccurately
-assume that the defendant is guilty because he has offered a guilty
plea.
The use of charging documents to establish the factual basis
should not be permitted. From an accuracy standpoint, merely
having defendants acknowledge that the language in these docu-
312 This is an extremely convenient method when a nob contendere plea is
being offered.
313 Cf. People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490, 50 N.W.2d 137 (1951) (defendant
declares that "'a State attorney is worse than none."' Id. at 496, 50 N.W.2d at
140).
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ments describes their conduct, creates many przbems.' The docu-
ments frequently contain technical language and' terms of art that
may be indecipherable to a lay defendant.
Although the court can move down the reliability hierarchy
until a sufficient factual basis is established, the number of alter-
native methods available probably will be fewer when the plea is a
misdemeanor. Certain proceedings which generate sources for a
factual basis will occur only where the original charge is a felony.814
Courts which have considered the time at which the factual
basis must be established agree that it need not be established when
the plea is offered. Rather, it may be established at any time prior
to sentencing. It might, however, cause psychological strain for the
defendant not to know if his plea has been accepted, and in rare
cases it may result in damage to the defendant's case if he is ulti-
mately required (trial-factual-basis) or desires (notice-factual-basis)
to stand trial.315 It is therefore desirable that the judge conduct the
accuracy inquiry as soon as possible after the plea is tendered.
The first consideration regarding the standard of proof is the
charge to which the standard of proof applies. The proposal advo-
cates that the factual basis for the defendant's plea should be evalu-
ated in comparison to the factual basis required for the crime to
which he pleaded, thus insuring that defendants who plead to nego-
tiated charges,3 18 as well as those who plead to original charges, will
be protected by the accuracy inquiry. Acceptance of a plea where a
factual basis is shown for another crime to which the defendant is
314 Misdemeanor cases, for example, do not require grand juries or preliminary
hearings; therefore, no transcripts of those proceedings are available to establish a
factual basis.
315The defense attorney may suspend investigation and preparation if the
defendant indicates a desire to plead. If the plea is later rejected, some of the
witnesses and evidence may be unavailable for trial.
Such failure to investigate is contrary to the ABA defense standards:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the ease and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant
to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always
include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution
and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless
of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts consututing
guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty.
ABA Dxs -usE STANDAnDS, supra note 44, at § 4.1 (emphasis supplied).
310 The offense to which the defendant pleads need not be a lesser included
offense. "[W]e reiterate our conviction that the plea bargain plays a vital role in
our system of criminal procedure; we would be loath to reduce its usefulness by
confining it within the straightjacket of 'necessarily included offenses."' People v.
West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 613, 477 P.2d 409, 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 397 (1970). The
offense must be one which the defendant actually committed, however, or else no
truthful factual basis can be obtained.
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not pleading 117 distorts the protection policy underlying the factual
basis requirement even if the factual basis is for a crime of equal or
greater severity than the one charged. There is no justification for
creating lingering feelings of injustice which the defendant may
experience 318 when his recitation of facts (even if they indicate the
original crime charged was committed) would be insufficient for a
guilty verdict at trial on the charge of which he will stand convicted.
Nor is there justification for convicting a person of any crime
merely because he admits to the commission of a crime with which
he was never charged. The only way to effectuate the protective
role of the accuracy inquiry is to require that the factual basis satisfy
the crime to which the defendant is pleading.3 19
The selection of the standard of proof to be required presents
a difficult problem because there are currently many different stand-
ards being used for varying purposes within the criminal justice
system. 820 The standard chosen for factual basis purposes could
differ from other standards, however, because a defendant in this
context is admitting guilt rather than contesting it as in all other
proceedings.32 1  The protection policy does, however, suggest the
utility of an established standard. If the defendant is to be pro-
tected, the factual basis should test all elements of the crime. Be-
cause a defendant may not be convicted at trial without proof of all
the elements of the crime,822 the standard of proof chosen should
also make it impossible to accept the defendant's guilty plea unless
all the elements are established during the factual basis determina-
tion. Without proof of every element, innocence must be assumed.
3 17 The A.B.A. authorizes such a procedure. ABA PLEA STANDARDS, supra
note 2, at 32-33.
318 See note 39 supra.
319 A limited exception to this prophylactic rule would be the rare circumstance
in which (1) the defendant is pleading to a negotiated charge; (2) the charge was
selected for its preferred sentencing options; (3) the defendant could not offer a
truthful factual basis to any other charge with similar sentencing provisions within
the jurisdiction; and (4) the judge is unwilling to engage in sentence bargaining on
the original charge to which the defendant could offer a truthful factual basis. If
the judge refuses to negotiate as to the sentence imposed for a given charge, the
defendant should be allowed to waive the factual basis requirement (which is
required only for his protection) and plead to a charge without a factual basis.
320 See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (preponderance of evi-
dence standard for judging voluntariness of confession); In Re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard for determining guilt at trial);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (probable cause standard for warrantless arrests).
321 The defendant is not contesting that it was he who committed the act, but
merely inquiring whether the act which he committed is a crime.
3 22 See Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974); Thompson v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
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Adoption of a standard of proof requiring all elements of the
crime to be established will necessitate the use of inferences. In-
ferences can, of course, be drawn from evidence at trial; 323 there is
no logical reason why inferences should not be drawn at the plea.324
The defendant should, however, be informed by the judge that al-
though the requisite knowledge or intent for the offense has not
been directly proven, the judge can legally draw such inferences
from the facts, and that he is prepared to do so if the defendant
wishes to plead.
Even if proof of every element is required, the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard 3 25 need not be invoked.32 6 A more ap-
propriate test for the factual basis would be the directed verdict
test.827 This test focuses on establishing the elements of the crime.
It enjoys the distinct advantage of currently being used in every
jurisdiction. As a result, the standard would be available for im-
mediate implementation through the interpretation of prior case
law. The choice of the directed verdict standard implies that only
admissible evidence may be considered for factual basis purposes.
This concern for the quality of proof, in addition to concern for the
amount of proof, relates to the definition of factual and legal inno-
cence. Concern for the admissibility of the evidence 3 28 would bene-
323 See People v. Wright, 44 Mich. App. 111, 205 N.W.2d 62 (1972).
324 People v. Nicholson, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 1142 (1977) (a judge accepting a plea is entitled to draw the same
inferences that a jury might if considering the same information).
3 25 See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
326 There is no necessity to equalize the minimum standards for convictions by
plea and by trial, see note 321 supra, although this has been cited as a reason for
applying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to the factual basis determina-
tion. Heverling, Judicial Review of the Guilty Plea, 7 IANcoaLN L. REv. 137, 184
(1972).
327 The directed verdict test is also referred to as a motion for judgment of
acquittal. See FED. R. Camn. P. 29. A motion for directed verdict will be granted
if there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction. The test of sufficiency is
"'whether, taking the view most favorable to the government, a reasonably-mindedjury could accept the relevant evidence as adequate and sufficient to support the
conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v.
Amato, 495 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1013 (1974) (quoting
United States v. Jeffords, 491 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1974)). Despite the presence of
a reasonable doubt element in the directed verdict test, the test is not as stringent
as the standard for conviction at trial. At trial, the jury must weigh the evidence,
decide what evidence to credit, and-based on that determination-decide if the
state has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In the directed verdict test,
the fact finder's role as weigher of the evidence is replaced by a legal conclusion
that all the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the
government.
328 "No prosecutor should, in connection with plea negotiations, engage in,
perform, or condone any of the following:
1. Charging or threatening to charge the defendant with offenses for which the
admissible evidence available to the prosecutor is insufficient to support a guilty
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fit not only the factually innocent defendant, but also the defendant
who, although having committed the offense, would be acquitted at
trial because of the inadmissability of the evidence. Since trial-
for which the plea is a substitute-would protect this category of
defendants, the plea should do so as well. If the judge concludes
that although there is some evidence of every element of the charge,
it is not evidence that would be admissible at trial, he should so
inform the defendant under the procedures in Section II of the
proposal.
Section II of the proposal is designed for the plea that does not
have a sufficient factual basis. Because of the deficiency 329 in the
factual basis, the plea can be considered equivocal. Equivocal and
unequivocal pleas represent different types of pleas and different
standards should apply to each. Equivocal pleas should require a
lower standard of proof and a greater scope of inquiry in order to
be valid.
The unequivocal pleader admits that his conduct is factually as
alleged and he is dependent upon the judge to determine whether
he has commited a crime. In a sense this defendant entrusts him-
self to the judge's knowledge; therefore, he should have the strictest
standard applied to his plea. The equivocal pleader differs in that
he does not admit, but is willing to accept, the facts alleged against
him. The equivocal pleader should be allowed to rely on the judge
to point out reasonable defenses. If the defendant has possible
defenses made known to him and then chooses to plead, this plea is
sufficiently intelligent. If the plea is supported by an appropriate
waiver of any infirmities and is supported by a finding of "prob-
ability of conviction," it should be accepted.
The scope of the accuracy inquiry for the equivocal plea should
comport with a notice-factual-basis test that informs a defendant
of deficiencies in his offered plea that suggest possible innocence
without requiring the defendant to stand trial. Because the accu-
racy inquiry is intended to protect the defendant, he should be
allowed to waive its protection and have his plea accepted after re-
ceiving notice of the possible deficiencies if he concludes that,
under the circumstances, a plea is in his best interests. Whatever
verdict." NATIONAL ADVIsoRY Coi~nssroN ox CamuNA.L JusncE STANDAIms 
GoALS, CourTS § 3.6 (1973).
The National Advisory Committee also recommends that a plea not be accepted
if "[t]he admissible evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the offense
for which the plea is offered, or a related greater offense." Standard 3.7(8) at 60.
320 Possible sources of the deficiency could be conflicting facts, inference of a
legal defense, a claimed defense, a denial of guilt, a missing element, necessity of
inferring specific intent, inadmissible evidence, or a violation of a constitutional right.
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the nature of the deficiency, the defendant should be informed of
the deficiency on the record and permitted to waive it and persist in.
his plea. After indicating on the record that he is satisfied the de-
fendant is pleading with knowledge that there is a possible defense,
the judge may accept the plea if he concludes under the facts pre-
sented to him and indicates on the record that there is a probability
of conviction. 330 The probability of conviction standard should be
enforced for every equivocal plea. The trial judge's discretion
necessarily inheres in this standard. The judge can use his unique
knowledge not only of the law, but also of the dynamics of ,the trial
process to determine whether the, defendant's conviction. is
probable.33'
A recurring problem might arise when judges'exercise their
discretion and refuse to accept a defendant's plea. Since a de-
fendant has no absolute right to have his plea accepted even if it
has a sufficient factual basis,382 a judge may reject the plea when a
factual basis is insufficient. A presumption in favor of accepting
the plea should be created, however, whenever there is a sufficient
factual basis, or when-although there is an insufficient factual
basis-the defendant waives the accuracy determination protection
and the judge finds a probability of conviction at trial.
VIII. CosTs OF AN AccURAcY INQUIRY
An important consideration in evaluating the accuracy inquiry
is its cost. The cost of employing an accuracy inquiry mainly re-
sults from the extra time judges must spend with defendants to
make the inquiries, and the extra time required for trials of de-
fendants who would have been convicted on the basis of their guilty
pleas were it not for the accuracy inquiry. These time factors will,
of course, translate into a dollar cost for additional judges, support-
ing staff, and courtroom space which must be financed if existing
judges are unable to accommodate this extra time. Additional
costs include those of recording all pleas, transcribing pleas which
are appealed, litigating accuracy inquiry appeals, and trying or
330 In this area also the record requirement can reduce judicial abuse of dis-
cretion. Cf. United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1975) (trial judge
should state his reasons for rejecting guilty plea).
331 See, e.g., United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973). In accept-
ing defendant's plea, the judge reasoned: "'I am taking into consideration the
demeanor and appearance of Mr. Saunders, my evaluation of how he would appear
as a witness before a jury. I am taking into consideration Mr. Jerry's appearance
and demeanor and method of speaking and how I feel he might impress a jury.'
Id. 609.
332 Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
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repleading those cases that are reversed on appeal. The overall
cost of providing the accuracy inquiry, however, should prove
minimal. The accuracy inquiry should be a marginal time com-
ponent of the full plea colloquy, requiring, in most cases, one or
two minutes at most.333 This additional time will probably create
only a minimal increase in the work load of felony judges. 34
The only potentially major cost to the felony courts is the
added expense for trials of defendants who would have pleaded
guilty but for discovering through the accuracy inquiry that they
may not have committed the crime. If these people are factually
innocent, or learn of a possible legal defense through the accuracy
inquiry, the cost of their trials must be absorbed by the judicial
system. Failure to provide the accuracy inquiry and any resulting
trials implies that the system is willing to deceive defendants in
order to obtain pleas. Although the presence of counsel may mean
that few felony defendants will learn only at the plea stage that they
may be factually or legally innocent, courts should not tolerate the
assumption that a defendant has been informed by counsel of his
rights and possible defenses.33
Other costs associated with adoption of the inquiry in felony
pleadings are low. Because most, if not all, felony courts are courts
of record, most pleas are recorded as a matter of course. Even where
this is not presently the case, recording accuracy inquiries will re-
quire only a negligible expenditure because these courts are already
capable of recording testimony. The cost of transcripts for appeal
should also be minor because plea transcripts will usually be only a
few pages in length.
Establishing an accuracy inquiry procedure, of course, creates a
source of appellate litigation and the possibility of reversal of some
pleas. Although appellate courts are perhaps already overburdened
333 Cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 472 (1969) (voluntariness
inquiry requires only a few minutes).
334 This conclusion is borne out by past experience with the implementation of
the accuracy inquiry in federal courts. For example, during 1975, the 20 judges of
the Detroit Recorder's Court took 5,907 guilty pleas. REconniU's COUNT OF TaE
Crry OF Dxmorr, icmcaAN, 1975 ANNuAL REPORT. Each judge heard approxi-
mately 295 pleas in 1975, which would average out to between one and two pleas
a day, assuming 250 work days. Certainly each judge can find two to four extra
minutes to make accuracy inquiries. In no jurisdiction where this inquiry has been
instituted has the requirement ever been removed, implying favorable experience
with the requirement, insignificant disruption of the jurisdictions court system, or
both.
335 Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (impermissible to assume
defendant has been informed of his constitutional rights).
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with litigation involving guilty pleas, 36 the inquiry should not
appreciably increase, and may in fact decrease, the number of ap-
peals taken. Reversal on appeal will create an additional cost re-
sulting from re-pleading or conducting a trial; it does not mean,
however, that legally guilty people will be allowed to escape the
criminal sanction. The defendant's case will not be dismissed at
the appellate level. The prosecution will have the opportunity to
try the defendant or obtain a new plea. Furthermore, once trial
judges become familiar with the accuracy inquiry procedure, very
few pleas should require reversal.
The cost of implementing the accuracy inquiry for misde-
meanors is more difficult to estimate; a greater expenditure might
be required than in felony cases. In all but the major metropolitan
districts, the present staff of judges should be able to accommodate
the extra time per case required for the improved plea procedure,
as well as the time for an occasionally resulting trial.33 7 But even in
the high case volume courts, despite the horror stories of assembly-
line type dispositions,338 the inquiry should only require a maximum
of one to two additional judge-hours per day.83 9 At worst, some of
these courts may require one or two new judges and support per-
sonnel if it is determined that the existing judges cannot manage
the docket.
One real expense for the lower courts would be incurred by
making a record of the plea in courts that are not presently courts
of record.840 This could be done at minimal expense by using cas-
336 From 1965 to 1967, approximately 25% of all criminal appeals to the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals involved guilty pleas. Comment, Profile of a Guilty Plea:
A Proposed Trial Court Procedure for Accepting Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. EEv.
1195, 1211 n.90 (1971). The average guilty plea appeal in Illinois requires between
12 and 20 hours of research, brief and opinion writing, and argument. Comment,
Guilty Pleas in Illinois, 24 DEPAuL L. REv. 42, 91 (1974).
33 7 It might be assumed that an accuracy inquiry in the lower courts would lead
to an increased number of trials because the inquiry would enlighten the legally
ignorant, uncounseled defendant, or inform the poorly counseled defendant. Im-
provement in lower court due process, however, does not automatically translate into
more trials. After Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and the resulting
increase in the appointment of counsel for misdemeanants, total trials decreased in
some jurisdictions. Ingraham, The Impact of Argersinger-One Year Later, 8 LAw
& Soc'v !lEv. 615, 623-25 (1974).
338 See, e.g., Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 603, 605 (1956) (court heard 55 cases in 15 minutes); Mileski, supra note
108, at 479 (72% of cases in lower courts are heard in one minute or less).
339 Most jurisdictions have no more than 60 cases per day, only 30 of which
are pleas. At one to two additional minutes per plea, the inquiry will require one
to one and a half additional hours per day.
340 See S. KnANIz, supra note 111, at 185-86.
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sette electronic recording devices. 41 The plea, which need only be
transcribed in those rare instances where the defendant appeals,
would normally be short, and therefore inexpensive to transcribe.
The recorded plea proceedings could even be heard by the reviewing
court without transcription.
Furthermore, it should be recognized that very few misde-
meanor convictions are appealed. 3 2 The vast majority of those
appeals are likely to be from trials rather than pleas because the
defendant who made an initial decision not to contest guilt is less
likely later to contest his conviction. In addition, the trial de novo
procedures used for misdemeanors in many states 343 obviate the
need to appeal a conviction for the defendant who later regrets his
earlier plea.
IX. CONCLUSION
A survey of current procedures for the acceptance of guilty
pleas demonstrates the necessity of an accuracy inquiry for all de-
fendants, regardless of the degree of crime with which they are
charged. Under present procedures in many jurisdictions, a judge
can accept a plea upon hearing that the defendant wishes to plead
guilty; the possibility is great of convicting defendants who are
factually innocent. No factual or legal rationale favors the reten-
tion of a procedure that can so easily result in such an unjust out-
come. An effective accuracy inquiry is the simplest and most
reliable method of instituting a desired change.
The benefit of applying felony plea practices to misdemeanor
pleas is substantial. Those charged with misdemeanors will be pro-
tected from improper surrender of their rights.34 Courts will be
protected from accusations of improperly convicting the innocent
and the integrity of the courts will be enhanced. Society in general
will benefit from the greater productivity of innocent people who
would have been convicted but for the new procedure. These
people will have a better opportunity for additional future employ-
341ABA STANDArmS RELA&NG TO TRALt CounTs § 2.42 (Tent. Draft 1975):
[A] relatively simple audio reporting system may suffice for a docket of short cases
where appellate review is infrequent."
342 Note 108 supra.
343 See generally North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976); ROUGH JuSTICE, supra
note 33, at xviii.
344 Admittedly, no one knows how many innocent people are convicted of
crimes either by plea or trial. However, one study has shown that pressure on
defendants to plead guilty in the federal courts has induced a high rate of conviction
by pleas in cases in which no conviction would have been obtained if there had
been a trial. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARv. L. REv. 293, 295 (1975).
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ment because they will have no criminal record, and they will be less
likely to commit future criminal acts because of feelings of aliena-
tion generated by prior wrongful convictions.
Opposition to the accuracy inquiry is based on arguments of
convenience and cost. The meager time expenditure required for
the accuracy inquiry, however, would be more than offset by the
increased respect for and quality of justice in criminal courts, To
the extent that opposition to the accuracy inquiry is founded on
fears that defendants who learn of their, possible innocence orof
possible defenses may choose to exercise their rights and put the
state to the test of proving its charges, the admonition of Mr. Justice
Goldberg in Escobedo v. Illinois 45 is directly on point: "no system
of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for
its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through un-
awareness of their constitutional rights." 346
345 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
346 Id. 490.
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